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Article 9. Powerful, creative, comprehensive yet elegant, 3 Article 9 is
generally regarded as the most innovative of the Code's articles. Proceeding from the assumption that secured credit is a good thingperhaps the best thing-Article 9 would be the means to facilitate secured lending. 4 This would be accomplished by making secured lend5
ing simple, cheap, and, well, secure.
Secured credit might be made simple, cheap, and certain
through a variety of expedients, from skeletal, idiot-proof financing
statements with little potential for drafting error, to bright-line rules
for creating and perfecting the security interest. What "facilitates" secured credit more than any of those, however, is an idea that underlies the whole regime of secured credit-that is, the reigning
conceptualization of the security interest as "property." Because the
security interest has found its way into that particular and historically
hallowed legal category, Article 9's secured parties are figures of privi-

commercial law scholars of their generation, the greatest conceptual achievement in
the field was Article 9). Even the reporters for Revised Article 9 displayed appropriate
reverence in tinkering with what they described as perhaps the most successful statute
ever conceived. Steven Harris & Charles Mooney, A Property-Based Theory of Security
Interests: Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, 80 VA.L. REv. 2021, 2021 (1994). Doubtless,
the most stunning achievement of Article 9 is the elimination of the bewildering array
of pre-Code security devices (the chattel mortgage, pledge, conditional sale, and so
forth) together with the equally bewildering array of rules that governed them.
3 Although the principle draftsperson of Article 9 was Grant Gilmore, this style
of drafting is most commonly associated with Karl Llewellyn, primary architect of the
Code, and, in both legislative drafting and judging, has been referred to as the Grand
Style or Grand Tradition. See generally Karl Llewellyn, On the Current Recapture of the
Grand Tradition,9 U. CHii. L. Sc-r. Ric. 6 (1960), reprinted inJURISPRUDENCE 215 (1962)
(discussing the hallmarks of this style and extolling its virtues).
4 The first half of the twentieth century witnessed the invention of a dizzying
array of disparate security devices, each governing a particular pattern of personal
property financing, and each boasting its own terminology, limitations, rules of priority, etc. By the late 1940s, the law of chattel security was decidedly nonuniform and
excruciatingly complex. The seminal treatment of pre-Code security devices can be
found in 1 GRANT GILMORE, SEcuRrY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY, 1-286 (1965).
It was against this backdrop that the primary drafters of Article 9, Gilmore and Allison
Dunham, undertook to establish a unified'statute covering all forms of personal property financing transactions, imposing uniformity, order, and predictability. See id.
1-400.
5 See pre-revised U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. (1972) ("The aim of this Article is to provide a simple and unified structure within which the immense variety of present-day
secured financing transactions can go forward with less cost and with greater
certainty.").
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claring the security interest to be property does not, however, end at
the level of discreet individual priority disputes.
The property priority granted a secured claimant, coupled with
expansion in the forms of collateral amenable to capture under Article 9 ushered in by the 1998 revision,' 0 create the opportunity to
rent Theories, 10J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981). There followed a torrent of puzzle articles.
See, e.g., James J. White, Efficiency Justificationsfor PersonalProperty Security, 37 VA N. L.
RE\,. 473 (1984). The efficiency debate is "efficiently" summarized in Jay L. Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEx. L. REV. 795, 831-43 (2004).
8 In the wake of the failure of the law and economics literature to provide a
solution to the puzzle of secured credit, only the "folk theory" (the conventional premise that secured credit made credit easier to be had) was left standing. Lawrence
Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Immovable Object Versus the Irresistible Force:
Rethinking the Relationship Between Secured Credit and Bankruptcy Policy, 95 Mic-. L. REv.
2234, 2257 (1997). How secured credit can exist if it is inefficient is irrelevant to the
present Article-it does. However, its attendant costs to unsecured creditors, and
justifying secured credit on a normative basis, are of central concern. See also id. at
2258 ("[F] olk theory does not offer a normative justification at all.").
Another group of scholars seem to have recognized this issue, pointing out the
harmful effects worked on some classes of unsecured creditors in bankruptcy owing to
the priorty of secured creditors. The group, led in its early incarnation by Professor
Lynn LoPucki, was branded "Sympathetic Legal Studies" by Harris and Mooney, supra
note 2, at 2045, or the shorthand, if unflattering, "Symps." The label is likely unmerited in that others have offered proper law-and-economics efficiency explanations for
the same sort of adjustments to priority rules proposed by the Symps. See, e.g., Lucian
A. Bebchuk &Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Casefor Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE
LJ. 857, 913-21 (1996). On the other hand, whereas the worst the finance literature
has to say about secured credit is that it is, or might be, inefficient, LoPucki declares it
"blight." See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor'sBargain, 80 VA. L. REv. 1887,
1914 n.104 (1994).
In any event, it is reasonably accurate to say that, on the Symp view, some unsecured creditors are victims of secured credit and the priority given secured creditors
in bankruptcy. Id. at 1896-1902. Briefly, Professor LoPucki submits that secured
credit enables the debtor and its secured creditors to enjoy a kind of subsidy at the
expense of an array of unsecured creditors. Id. at 1920-21. Unsecured creditors, of
course, are not privy to the bargain between the debtors and the secured party that
generates the subsidy, either because they did not transact voluntarily with the debtor,
or because they are too uninformed and unsophisticated to recognize that it is being
imposed on them. Id. at 1924-31.
9 See infra note 10.
10 Revised Article 9 became available for enactment by the states in 1999, with a
delayed effective date of July 1, 2001. U.C.C. § 9-701 (2006). In its final form, it
represented a complete victory for the conveyancing model of security by making it
easier than ever before to create and perfect security interests in virtually anything
and everything with accompanying changes in the priority rules that offer even
stronger protection for the security interest against other claimants. See generally Julian B. McDonnell, Is Revised Article 9 a Little Too Greedy?, 104 Com. LJ. 241, 250
(1999) (expressing concern that, collectively, the new provisions on scope, filing and
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render the interests of unsecured creditors as a group worthless from
the get-go through so-called "judgment-proofing." Judgment-proofing is a simple matter of the debtor incurring debt secured under the
terms of an "all-assets" financing statement in an amount that is, or
more likely becomes, in excess of the liquidation value of its assetsand often foreseeably so. In this, security unchecked may impose a
threat to the entire liability system." That result, however, does not
have to flow from the prevailing understanding of security as property.
It is our contention that if the security interest is property, then secured credit deployed as a judgment-proofing scheme is a misuse of
property. As in all matters of misuse, the law should supply a remedy.
The remedy in the case of secured credit, however, has not been obvious, perhaps because those who have sought such a remedy have always done so by challenging the basic precepts of the property-based
conception of security. A more fruitful approach, we believe, is to
indulge the property metaphor on its own terms and then find a solution within the entailments that naturally flow from the metaphor.
The tort of nuisance has long safeguarded the quiet enjoyment of
landowners from disturbance in the form of unwelcome, harmful activity conducted on neighboring property. That is to say, the considerable freedom of use that attends private land ownership is not without
boundaries, and those boundaries are drawn somewhere at the edges
of a neighbor's quiet enjoyment. With property rights come property
responsibilities,and we would submit that it is analytically inconsequential whether those rights are real or personal, corporeal or
incorporeal.
Bewildering it is that a culture long intolerant of a nuisance that
threatens the quiet enjoyment of land should be so at ease with an
equally, if not more, noxious nuisance created by a personal property
interest-namely, the denigration of the rights of unsecured creditors
through the misuse of security. There is no currently recognized tort
of nuisance to regulate the unreasonable, even reprehensible, use of
priority could encourage preemptive filings designed to judgment-proof enterprises
fearing tort liabilities or other unsecured claims).
11 This is a major premise of Professor LoPucki's article, Lynn M. Lopucki, The
Death of Liability, 106 YALE LJ. 1, 14-19 (1996). The liability system, as LoPucki describes it, centers around the satisfied judgment. Id. at 14. With the value of an insolvent debtor's assets conveyed away to the secured creditor, nothing remains for
general creditors, either in or out of bankruptcy, rendering the basic component of
the liability system worthless. Id. Professor LoPucki's theses quickly became the object of scholarly attention expressed in a series of replies and rejoinders in the literature. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, The Inherent Irrationality of Judgwent Proofing, 52
STAN. L. REv. I (1999);JamesJ. White, CorporateJudgmrentProofing: A Response to Lynn
LoPucki's The Death of Liability, 107 YALE L.J. 1363 (1998).
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secured credit. But that is hardly to say that secured credit cannot be
deployed after a fashion prejudicial to neighboring interests in a
credit community-in other words, after a fashion that is eerily reminiscent of a private nuisance. This suggests that perhaps the time has
come to "discover" a tort that redresses that wrong in the same fashion
as the ancient tort of private nuisance responds to unreasonable excesses by landowners.
In this Article, therefore, we maintain that secured credit, when
perverted to accomplish a de facto judgment-proofing scheme, is a
nuisance, and a nuisance appropriately "abated" through the existing
and well-accepted principles of subordination. To establish this proposition, in Part I we discuss the security interest as a member of the
legal category "property," a conception of security emphatically embraced and reinforced on revision of Article 9. In addition, we try to
articulate why the understanding of security as property has been so
persistent and difficult to uproot.
In Part II, we examine and evaluate the implications of inclusion
of the security interest in the conceptualcategory of property with reference to insights into categorization that have emerged from recent
work in cognitive linguistics. Much of what we do in law is about categorizing, such that these insights into human conceptual systems shed
new light on the development of law, and thereby offer the opportunity to consider the transformation of legal doctrine from a fresh
perspective.
Having accepted (without necessarily agreeing with) the notion
of the security interest as entailing a conveyance of property, and also
explained the conceptual consequences that flow from that category,
in Part III we turn to an excursus into the law of nuisance as a corollary of the legal category "property." Then, in Part IV, we conflate the
discussion, making the case that nuisance doctrine offers a workable
and defensible rubric to ferret out and condemn the use of security as
a device for judgment-proofing. Lastly, in Part V, we propose what we
believe to be the remedial response most neatly tailored to abate the
"nuisance," that being full or partial subordination of the secured
claim.
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THE SECURITY INTEREST AS A MEMBER OF THE LEGAL
CATEGORY PROPERTY

A.

The Good Ship "ConceptualAlternatives" Has Sailed...

The security interest, we are instructed, owes its existence to a
security agreement that "creates or provides for it,"12 suggesting, it
would seem, that the concepts by which security is understood are
mainly those same legal concepts that structure the law of contracts.1 3
In fact, however, there is fundamentally very little about security, as we
have come to regard it, that depends on conceptual structures other
than those that derive from property law. The evidence is everywhere,
and the fact that security is about property, plain and simple, is frankly
granted.' 4 It is a matter on which there is nearly universal accord,
15
albeit not universally cheerful accord.
12 U.C.C. § 9-102(a) (73) (2006). This aspect of the definition of "security agreement" was also found in the 1972 version of the statute. See pre-revised U.C.C. § 9105(1)(l) (1972).
13 Of course, the security agreement is in many regards just that-an agreement.
U.C.C. § 9-203 contains statute of frauds and consideration (value given) requirements. But the security agreement in its most significant sense is understood as something of a deed. The controversial features of Article 9 (namely priorities and
consequent implications for unsecured creditors) are a product of the property concepts and its attendants, most notably, the imperative nemo dat. In this singular regard, the security agreement is a conveyancing document, For the most part, the role
of contract doctrine is limited to defining the relationship of the debtor and secured
creditor. See generally F. Stephen Knippenberg, Future Nonadvance Obligations: Preferences Lost in Metaphor, 72 WAsH. U. L.Q. 1537, 1571-80 (1994) (offering an account of
the security agreement as contract and the metaphors that structure the contract
relationship).
14 References in the literature which take as a given that security is property are
common. See, e.g., James W. Bowers, Whither What Hits the Fan?: Murphy's Law, Bankruptcy Theory, and the Elementary Economics of Loss Distribution, 26 GA. L. REV. 27, 59
(1991) (referring to the secured creditor as a co-owner of the collateral with the
debtor). In The Impairment of Secured Creditors' Rights in Reorganization: A Study of the
Relationship between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV.L. REV. 973
(1983), ProfessorJames Rogers states, "The notion that the secured creditor's remedial right is a 'property' right may derive much of its intuitive force from the perception of the mortgage on Blackacre as the paradigm of secured financing." Id. at 992
n.74. The idea that the creation of a security interest is a conveyance is thus largely
unquestioned and deeply entrenched in doctrine. But the idea of the security interest as property first becomes an express policy justification for secured credit at the
hands of Harris and Mooney. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 2, at 2024-25,
2047-66.
15 Professor LoPucki, for example, is not convinced security is property (or, perhaps, that it should be) in every way. Rather, he regards that position to be only a
"theory" (and a bad one, he believes) by which security has come to be understood
and justified, See LoPucki, supra note 8, at 1947-48, 1952-54; see also Carl S. Bjerre,
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fiercely rational orientation, propositional answers are derived that
promise certainty in a manner that alternative imaginative and metaphoric structures of thought on their face do not.21 Propositional answers, no less an appealing commodity in legal reasoning than in any
other endeavor, are doubtless especially attractive in the context of
the law governing banks, finance companies, merchants, and their
lawyers. The superimposition of syllogistic reasoning on what may in
fact be largely metaphoric reasoning processes, as we shall discuss, creates an arguably false but nonetheless comforting sense of
determinacy.
Second (and this is directly relevant to the conveyance theory of
security), to model security on property concepts invokes a powerful
set of real and emotive associations unique to private property ownership, and particularly ownership of land. Early in the history of the
Republic, good citizenship and a host of other highly revered virtues
were closely associated with the ownership of land. 22 Beyond this
(and far beyond this), property ownership is closely bound with notions of liberty: "Property was important for the exercise of liberty,
and liberty required the free exercise of property rights ....Without

23
security [protection), property lost its value."
Finally, on a related but individual level, the dimensions of the
concept of property-the most salient of which is "boundedness"were seen as assuring personal autonomy, privacy, and "freedom from
the collective." 24 The boundary image, central to traditional concep21

See infra text accompanying notes 39-43.

22 See Stanley N. Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary
America, 19 J.L. & ECON. 467, 474-76 (1976) (discussing Jefferson's notions about
land ownership, independent labor, and politics).

In the mid-eighteenth century,

every American colony, save one, limited the suffrage to those who owned land. RobertJ. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L. Rrv. 335,
337 (1989). There was popular consensus that there was no real independence without private property ownership. Id. Chief among the concerns associated with creating a new government was protection of private property. Jennifer Nedelsky, Law,
Boundariesand the Bounded Self, in LAW AND THE ORDER Or CULTURE 162, 162-63 (Robert Post ed., 1991). Adams once remarked, "[V]ery few men who have no property,
have anyjudgment of their own." Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan, in 9 THE
WORKS OF JOHN ADAMs 376 (C. Adams ed., Boston, Little Brown and Co., 1864).
23 Nedelsky, supra note 22, at 164. The author continues, "Property effectively
captures this link between liberty and security in that it literally loses its meaning
without security. We mean by property that which is recognized to be ours and cannot easily be taken from us-hence the connection between property and ... law and
government." Id. at 165.
24 This, of course, is consistent with Charles Reich's renowned article, The New
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). In calling for a new definition of property, Reich
asserts: "Property draws a circle around the activities of each private individual or
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symwas
If early on property ownership
entailments that follow from that association.
posseshaving
liberty, the prospect of a debtor
bolic of autonomy, virtuous labor, and
e.g.,
in a creditor was regarded as fraud. See,
resided
sion of collateral while its value
that
reasoned
courts
These
1819).
279-80 (Pa.
Clow v. Woods, 5 Serg. & Rawle 275,
other
collateral was in a position to dupe
mortgaged
the
of
possession
the debtor with
to
available
be
that the encumbered asset would
creditors into the mistaken belief
the
resolved
9
Article
event of default. Of course,
satisfy their unsecured claims in the problem that the collateral in the hands of the
"ostensible ownership" problem-the
to the secured
its value has been conveyed away
debtor looks precisely the same after
associated
§ 9-205 cmt. 2. However, the problems
creditor as it did before. See U.C.C.
obviously, remain.
with the redistributive effect of security,
is better
are convinced more secured credit
27 Simply put, we believe those who
category.
legal
a
as
ally they find in property
than less will not relinquish the powerful
Information: The Article 9 Full Priority
Imperfect
with
Policy
Making
See Elizabeth Warren,
credit-constriction claim is the
("The
1386 (1997)
Debates, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1373,
of the proponents of full priority.").
most forceful weapon in the arsenal
text.
28 See supra note 17 and accompanying
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the purveyors of debt fiAssured of priority, so the theory goes,
their capital and more readily acnancing will more readily part with
the comfort of collateral to
cept risk that would be intolerable without
(and, ergo, abundant)
hedge the risk of insolvency. Affordable
of promoting enterms
in
credit-undeniably a good thing
business growth-nevertheless
trepreneurial activity and sustaining
manner to ensure the reasonable
sours if not disciplined in some
2 9 Among other salutary effects, the
alignment of risk and reward.
attendant to taking security
threat of withdrawal of the privileges
to engage in more rational credit
might encourage secured lenders
of credit once extended,
30
decisions, as well as more careful monitoring
in certain cases. To
costs
credit
higher
somewhat
at
albeit possibly
to the revision of Article 9 might
be sure, a more balanced approach
and done so in a far more effihave perhaps produced such a result
Certainly the proposals were out
cient fashion than we propose here.
3
they arrived. ' They were disthere, but they were dismissed before
at odds with the drafters' commitmissed precisely because they were
ment to a conveyance model of security.
that no paradigm shift is in the
And so, we are resigned to the fact
well beyond. Revised Article
offing, not in our lifetimes and probably
reasoning and an objectivist ap9 has seen to it that propositional
the intractable, outcome-reproach to legal categories will continue
in the most ontological
quired definition of security as "property" suggest that alternative
means to
sense of the term. But that is by no
inform analysis and yet encannot
insights into conceptual categories
a more equitable distributive balable law transformation aimed at
egregious cases. The potential of
ance, or at least do so in the most
is explored in Part II, but first we
those insights to accomplish both
of the contours and consequences
offer a more detailed explanation
that controls our contemof the conventional view of legal categories
that backdrop that
against
It is then
porary understanding of security.
29

101-08; infra note 209 and accompanying
See infra text accompanying notes

text.
30

Mann, Exstill unanswered. Cf Ronald J.
The empirical evidence is, frankly,
(offering
(1997)
110 HARV. L. REv. 625, 638-58
plaining the Pattern of Secured Credit,
and unsecured
between
motivates parties to elect
some empirical evidence on what
priority rules effec-

the proposition that full
secured credit). However, even accepting
that is a good
still begs the question of whether
tively lower the cost of credit, this
reduction in
the
that question depends on whether
thing. Ultimately, the answer to
in excess
creditors,
unsecured
other parties, like
the price of credit imposes costs on
(identify1388-92
at
27,
note
supra
See Warren,
of the savings derived from security.
purely the price of credit).
ing other costs to consider beyond
the rejection
see also supra note 17 (discussing
575;
31 SeeJanger, supra note 2, at
9 revision process).
of the carve-out proposal in the Article
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possibilities offered by an alwe consider the perceptiveness and the
legal concepts as it applies to
ternative approach to categorization of
law in general, and security in particular.
The Objectivist Account of Legal Categories
to understand security
While it is convenient fov many purposes
security interest as property is
in property terms, the conception of the
32
to say that security is concepby no means required. It is one thing
else
concepts and something
33
tually defined with reference to property
sense.
priori
a
in an
again to observe that it is property
and consequential as it may
But that distinction, as fundamental
legal categories have come to
be, is often blurred or even lost because
terms. And the conventional
be understood generally in conventional
in law as elsewhere must be conview has it that conceptual categories
and sufficient indicia or conditions
structed by reference to necessary
34 In turn, those conditions are existentially
for category membership.
define. They are not, that is to
determinate as are the categories they
from the cognitive operators of
say, dependent upon any contribution
status quite apart from mental
the reasoner, but enjoy .an5 ontological
inherently "P or not P" because
(conceptual) categories 3 A thing is
naturally residing in the
it is possessed or not of the characteristics
as it comes to be detercategory at hand. Category membership,
by comparison to a set of
mined, is therefore objectively verifiable
world external to human conconditions that obtain in the natural
B.

Their
Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert
32 See Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen
235,
Rv.
L.
N.Y.U.
70
or Victims of the FreshStart?,
Assets on the Eve of Bankruptcy: Villains
dysfunctional
to
leads
model of security
299 (1995) (arguing that the conveyance
to exempt immediately before banknonexempt
from
assets
of
analysis of conversion
8, at 2284-86 (calling for a value-based,
ruptcy); Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note
instead of the prevailing conveyance
bankruptcy
in
priority account of secured claims
consider ...
]
"[T here is no ineluctable reason to
model). As Professor Bjerre puts it,
have been
There
363.
at
15,
note
supra
" Bjerre,
security interests as property.
credisecured
a
For instance, in bankruptcy,
inroads on the conceptual monopoly.
11
itself.
collateral
the
value of the collateral, not
tor's secured claim is limited to the
does
interest
security
a
that
2006). The notion
U.S.C.A. § 506(a) (West 2000 & Supp.
of
possession is inconsistent with the concept
of
right
the
encompass
not necessarily
for
Agenda
9-An
See Peter F. Coogan, Article
security as property in every particular.
(1978) (suggesting that the Code had
1028-30
1012,
the Next Decade, 87 YALE L.J.
of
of security as property to a conception
moved incrementally away from the concept

the security interest as a priority claim).
note 8, at 2285.
33 See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra
view of categories. It is, however,
classical
the
to
course,

34 We refer here, of
supra note
taken as empirical fact. See LAKOFF,
more than a view; rather, it is regularly
19 at 6; Bjerre, supra note 15, at 355.
(1980).
METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 122-25
35 See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARKJOHNSON,
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cepts.3 6 Under the conventional view, then, it is the business of conceptual categories not simply to emulate but literally to replicate
objective reality, and they are at their worst when they befoul it by
37
introducing imaginative principles.
For this to occur, conceptual categories are, or must be, precise
representations of categories as they exist in the world external to the
reasoner. And so, on this view, our conceptual categories are algorithmic. They are correct when the symbols they make use of mirror the reality they purport to represent. Otherwise, they are
incorrect and there is neither room for near nor far membership.
As noted earlier, 38 the conventional view proceeds from objectivist assumptions about the world of experience, 39 and in law finds expression in the dogma of formalism. The formalist strategy, so
familiar by now as to be second nature in traditional legal analysis, is
to abstract principles from cases, then apply those principles to succeeding cases. 40 The principles themselves, on boiling away the factual content of the cases from which they are gleaned and extracted,
now purport to be amenable to disinterested application in subsequent fact-rich cases by neutral judges. The neutrality can be supposed, so long as the principles are properly understood and brought
36 The popular view of conceptual categories "understands categorization either
as about natural sets of objects in the world or, when it recognizes categorization as
humanly constructed, as about objects with ascertainable properties or criteria that
establish their commonality." Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric
Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1105, 1108 (1989) (explicating the work of Lakoff and Johnson on conceptual categories). The associated
epistemology is sometimes referred to generally as "objectivism." See MARKJOHNSON,
THE BODY I THE MIND 196 (1987); LAKorr, supranote 19, at 157-84. On the objectivist account, the world is comprised of various phenomena, events, and objects inherently possessed of naturally occurring characteristics, properties and relationships.
These are mind-independent. Id. at 8-11; see also RICHARDJ. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTWIVSM AND RELATivisM 8 (1983) (using the term "objectivism" in the same sense as
Lakoff and Johnson).
37 Professor jerre states it nicely: "Every categorization question thus has a simple, yes or no answer; the object either belongs or does not belong, and no intermediate result is possible. Under this view, we categorize stimuli based solely on objective
criteria that are independent of the imagination .... The categorization process is computer-like in its objectivity, impersonality and bipolarity." Bjerre, supranote 15, at 355 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
38 See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
39 See supra notes 36-37.
40 The methodology is familiar. Principles are abstracted from cases to be restated as legal propositions. Thereafter, it is only a matter of bringing the propositions to bear on the facts at hand. See Michael S. Moore, The Semantics ofJudging,54 S.
CAL.

L. REv. 151, 155 (1981).
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transcend their concrete
to bear, because the principles themselves
41
cases.
instantiations in particular
forcefully at work in law.
In this way, objectivism is quietly but
that knowledge results from
The objectivist program generally insists
reflect an objectively verifiable
discovering concepts, which directly
on
world, that are in no way dependent
state of affairs in the physical
42
presumes a uniquely correct ressubjective interpretation. Formalism
privileges are privileges, a
olution of legal issues: rights are rights,
it is, it is property for all purposes,
thing is property or it is not, and, if

4 3 This is the sense in which the security interest
and that is that.
to be

category determined
comes to find inclusion in the conceptual
"property."
II.

A.

AN

PROPERTY AS A
ALTERNATIVE VIEW OF CATEGORIES:
RADIAL CATEGORY

the Nature of Categories
Insights of the Cognitive Sciences into

the cognitive sciences and
Beginning in the 1980s, research in
are
imaginative cognitive devices
4 4 The
linguistics developed the insight that
and rationality.
central to human knowledge, understanding,
has been referred
work
that
from
view of human cognition to emerge
45 and stands in sharp
to by its chief architects as "experientialism," objectivism. The case
precepts of
contradistinction to the underlying
is a pervasive and critical comwas made that metaphor, for example, 46
Metaphoric concepts are
ponent of human reasoning processes.
See Knippenberg, supra note 13, at 1560-61.
then, is an
at xxi-xxiv. At the root of objectivism,
42 SeeJOHNSON, supra note 36,
epistemology of transcendentalism.
the
Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for
43 See Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive
(1989).
Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REv. 871, 881-90
JOHNSON,
in the world could be meaningful."
nothing
imagination,
"Without
44
the claim
(making
3
at
&JOHNSON, supra note 35,
supra note 36, at ix; see also LAKOrF
are metaphoric).
that ordinary human conceptual systems
35,
generally LAKOFF &JOHNSON, supra note
see
xv;
at
19,
note
supra
45 See LAKOFF,
truth exists and that
absolute
that
both
denies
at 226-28 (noting that experientialism
insights of
The methodology suggested by the
it is necessary to function successfully).
time to
from
analysis
legal
in
bear
brought to
the experientialist program has been
Knip&
Knippenberg, supra note 13; Ponoroff
time. See, e.g., Bjerre, supra note 15;
36.
note
supra
Knippenberg, supra note 8; Winter,
the
penberg, supranote 32; Ponoroff &
of
Implications
The
Seriously:
Taking Metaphor
46 See, e.g., Gerald W. Casenave,
Paul
(1979);
19
PHIL.
S.J.
17
Theories of Language,
Cognitive Significance of Metaphor for
5 CRITICAL INCognition, Imagination, and Feeling,
as
Process
Metaphorical
The
Ricoeur,
of
systematic, and important treatment
QUiRY 143 (1978). The most comprehensive,
and
Lakoff
of
work
the
in
is to be found
the role of metaphor in human cognition
note 35,
LAKOFF &JOHNSON, supra
276-78;
at
19,
note
supra
LAKOFF,
Johnson. See, e.g.,
41

2oo6]

HAVING

ONE'S

PROPERTY

AND

EATING

IT

TOO

much more than rhetorical contrivances to be consigned to the domain of the poetic. 4 7 Rather, in direct contravention to the objectivist
account, experientialism teaches that our metaphoric concepts are
central to cognitive operations.
Metaphoric reasoning is primary in complex thought; that is to
say, it is fundamental to all but the most rudimentary concepts,

48

and,

of equal import, it is unavoidable. The essence of metaphoric reasoning makes it possible to understand and reason about concepts that
lack natural dimensions of their own in terms of other well-defined
concepts, 49 and to do so without declaring the former to be the latter

in a literal sense. A simple example from legal doctrine serves to illustrate. The concept, "contract," is partially delineated by the metaphor, "a-contract-is-a-container-for-the-contracting-parties."
The
metaphoric concept is evident in the language. For instance, parties
"enter into the contract" and "cannot get out of the contract. ' 0
at 61-105;JJOHNSON, supra note 36, at 65-100. They refer to their account of human
rationality and associated epistemology as "experiential realism" or, simply, "experientialism." See LAKOFF, supra note 19, at xv. Other scholarly exegesis of metaphor has
been undertaken by rhetoricians and other language scholars, among them Max
Black. See MAx BLACK, MODELS AND METAPHOR 25-47, 49 (1962). For a more complete listing, see Thomas Ross, Metaphor and Paradox, 23 GA. L. REv. 1053 (1989).
47 SeeJOHNSON, supra note 36, at 112 ("[Mletaphors . . . are not merely convenient economies for expressing our knowledge; rather they are our knowledge. .. ");
see also LAKoFF & JOHNSON, supra note 35, at 5 ("The metaphor is not merely in the
words we use-it is in our very concept of an argument. The language of argument is
not poetic, fanciful, or rhetorical; it is literal.").
48 Rudimentary concepts are those apprehended directly through our senses,
from interaction with our physical surroundings. They include such concepts as "updown," "containment," "verticality," "part-whole," "front-back," and so forth. LAKOFF
& JOHNSON, supra note 35, at 57. These are "natural kinds of experience," as they
have naturally occurring dimensions and so are directly understood on their own
terms-not in terms of other concepts-without the necessity of sophisticated cognitive mechanisms such as metaphoric reasoning. Id. at 117-19. These experiences are
meaningful because they recur endlessly as we interact with our physical surroundings. JOHNSON, supra note 36, at 13. These recurring patterns are the basis for kinesthetic image schematic structures, or "image schema." Id. at 28-30.
49 This is the essence of the experientialist claim. For example, the concept
trouble" lacks natural dimensions of its own, and so must be understood indirectly
through the metaphor, "trouble-is-a-container." The emergent concept, "containment," partially delineates the concept "trouble," such that we can understand ourselves as being "in trouble," or unable to "get out of trouble." LAKOFF & JOHNSON,
supranote 35, at 29-32. The stick-like, simple structure of image schematic concepts,
such as "containment," allow for this kind of cross-conceptualization. Id. at 29.
50 Of course, the single ontological metaphor does not offer a complete understanding of the target concept. Instead, the metaphor highlights one aspect of the
concept under consideration. Multiple metaphors must be deployed to enrich other
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and of immediate
Another vital component of human rationality,
51
The process is critical to
relevance to this Article, is categorization.
as shown above, it can influence
making sense of our experience and,
The insights of the experientialour understanding of legal concepts.
conceptual categories are not (or
ist program have shown that human
around mind-independent objects
do not have to be) constructed
compared with a set of
with innate properties that are perfunctorily
5 2 To the concategory membership.
naturally occurring conditions of
of rationality, are dependent
trary, categories, like other components principles. 53
conceptual
upon imaginative, or creative,
category structures have been
While other types of conceptual
54
is directly apposite for present purcatalogued, the "radial" category
to the conventional view of categoposes and exists in sharp contrast
and reasoning. Radial categories
ries that has pervaded legal thought
According to the experientialare ideational constructs of rationality.
around a central category
ist view, radial categories are structured
55 This is the category protomember, or so-called "best example.
if, and the degree to
type.5 6 Categorization then entails determining

shares properties with the cenwhich, a stimulus under consideration
5 7 The extent and level of sharing-the degree
tral category member.
expressed

of the category as
to which the stimulus is representative
relative membership.
through the category prototype-determines

For instance, contract obligations are
aspects of the concept to arrive at meaning.
36, at 35.
physical burdens. JOHNSON, supra note
also understood metaphorically as
categorizathan
basic
("There is nothing more
51 See LAKOFF, supra note 19, at 5
and speech.").
action,
perception,
tion to our thought,
24.
at
36,
note
supra
52 JoHNsoN,
say, concategories are conceptual, that is to
53 Under the experientialist view,
objects.
of
rather than inherent properties
structs of imaginative human perception,
mimand
trapped
reality
are not slices of
Id. at 23-28. Thus, conceptual categories
experiwhich
by
means
the
are
our reality. They
icked symbolically; rather, they are
of
For an excellent, manageable summation
meaningful.
made
and
ence is organized
note 36, at 1148-56.
these principles, see Winter, supra
and sca287-88 (describing, for example, graded
at
54 See Lakoff, supra note 19,
lar categories).
55 Bjerre, supra note 15, at 356.
catbut instructive example-the conceptual
56 Professor Bjerre offers the simple
conof
the failure of the objectivist account
egory "cup." Id. at 356-57. After noting
in which we deploy that category in
manner
the
for
ceptual categories to account
explaapproach offers a much more satisfactory
experience, he explains: "The radial
by a
exemplified
be
to
said
be
can
cup
of a
nation: the prototypical characteristics
shares
'cup'
else to which we apply the word
coffee cup or a teacup, and everything
to various principles." Id.
according
one or more of those characteristics
discussion of the context of legal categoriza57 See id. at 355-56. For an extended
tion, see Winter, supra note 36, at 1148-59.
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The radial model thus admits of "graded" membership, in a manner that conventional categories do not,58 such that category mem-

bers may be understood to "radiate" from the category prototype.59
Where the reasoner is persuaded (although, actually, most categorization occurs at the unconscious level 6° ) that there is a correspondence
of characteristics and a sufficient degree of correspondence, category
61
membership is assigned and awarded. Otherwise, it is denied.
It is important to recognize that characteristic sharing is not limited to literal sharing. Correspondence of characteristics can indeed,
and frequently do, occur at the nonliteral level. For instance, a potential member might share traits with the category prototype at the metaphoric level through extension. 62 The principle is illustrated using
the security interest as an example in Part II.B., which follows.
B.

Property Understood as a Radial Category

The legal conceptual category "property," like any other conceptual category, can be structured radially. 6- This produces a much
more nuanced and contextualized understanding of the concept and
what it means to be a member of the category than can be had under
the conventional view. The central member, or category prototype,
might be the "house,'

64

and its salient features would include at least

the following: a physical locus and stability over time. The house is
58
59

See supra text accompanying note 43.
See LAxorv, supra note 19, at 91-114.

60

"Ontological metaphors . .. are so pervasive in our thought that they are usu-

ally taken as self-evident, direct descriptions of mental phenomena." LAKOFF & JOHNSON, sUpra note 35, at 28.
61 This is not the same as asserting that category membership is assigned on the
basis of necessary and sufficient conditions. Rather, it is to say that, "At some point,
the resemblance of a stimulus to a prototype grows weak enough (though it may still
exist) that people do not include the stimulus in the category. This point is determined not by any objective measure, but by tacit social convention. This convention is
presumably based, in turn, on a balance between the usefulness and the confusion
that would result from inclusion." Bjerre, supra note 15, at 356 & n.202; see also
LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 35, at 145 (making a similar point).
62 Four such principles have been identified and described, including extension
by metaphor. For a truncated but enlightening account of the principles of extension
illustrated utilizing the legal category "property," see Bjerre, supra note 15, at 355 &
n.202.
63 Our treatment of the conceptual category "property" as a radial category draws
on the work of Professor Bjerre. See id. at 354-64.
64 Id. at 357 n.208. As Professor Bjerre explains:
While this choice is not inevitable, it is strongly justifiable. In my own un-

scientific survey.. . the image most strongly called to nearly everyone's mind
by the word property was the single-family house surrounded by land. It is
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utile and functional. It offers, among other things, safety, security,
and a place of residence. It has value and so represents a source of
wealth. It is freely alienable by the owner, who has the nearly absolute
right to deploy its value according to his or her whim. Value added by
way of improvements inure to the benefit of the owner. The house
quite literally serves to exclude others than the owner and the owner
has the right to exclude as well. So what do houses have to do with
security interests?
Under the radial model, the security interest finds its way into the
legal category "property" not because it is a house of course, but owing instead to the characteristics it shares with the category prototype,
literally and nonliterally. 65 Literally, the security interest is alienable;
it represents a form of wealth and, arguably, is the product of the
owner's labor. 6 6 But it is obvious that the security interest is more
representative of the prototype at the metaphoric level, the level at
which there is a closer correspondence of traits that explain inclusion
of the security interest in the property category. For example, the security interest in inventory, accounts, and other self-renewing forms of
collateral enjoys stability or duration. 67 The security interest itself is
also the meaning most likely to be carried by a layperson's use of the term:
'Get off of my property!'
Id. Because central membership is a matter of cultural consensus, central members
may come and go over time as the common perception as to the best representative of
the category changes. See Winter, supra note 36, at 1172-74 (describing the changing
conception of the term "park" in the context of an ordinance prohibiting vehicles in
city parks). ProfessorJeanne Schroeder, though she does not analyze property as a
radial category in the terms supplied by the experientialist program, nevertheless undertakes to isolate and describe prototypical property. She posits that a grasped tangible object may be at the center of the conceptual category. Jeanne L. Schroeder, Some
Realism About Legal Surrealism, 37 WM. & MARY L. REv. 455, 491 (1996). Schroeder's
account of prototypical property forms part of the basis for her earlier article,Jean L.
Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-O-Stix: A Feminist Critique of the Disaggregationof Property,93
MicH. L. REv. 239 (1994) [hereinafter Schroeder Bundle of Stix) (examining Jeremy

Waldron's definition of Property).
65 Professor Bjerre illustrates the literal and nonliteral sharing of characteristics
using the patent, as well as the security interest, as examples. Bjerre, supranote 15, at
359-61.
66 Bjerre acknowledges that, perhaps, there is a lingering bias against the notion
that lending is "productive work." The form-of-wealth characteristic might, however,
as easily be expressed as the form-of-protection trait. Id. at 360 n.217.
67 Id. at 361. This is the so-called floating lien, frequently expressed in the familiar, cloud-over-a-river metaphor. The fluctuating mass of self-renewing collateral is
conceptualized as a gestalt, a single entity that grows and shrinks, See also Knippenberg, supra note 13, at 1580 (making the claim that Gilmore's "unitary view" of
the security interest is based on the metaphor, "the-security-interest-is-an-expanding
mass" in the context of future advances).
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not a tangible thing, but one of the most singular remedies available
to the secured creditor is the right to seize the tangible personal property.68 The right to seize the collateral is conflated with the collateral
seized, creating a recognizable, nonliteral correspondence with the
traits of the tangible category prototype.6 9 The security interest literally offers "security"-protection, that is to say-from intruders in the
form of other creditors who would lay claim to the collateral; and the
secured creditor has the right to exclude others (other claimants)
who endeavor to gain priority to the collateral.
The security interest is thus a member of the property category by
dint of radial extension from the category prototype accomplished
metaphorically. 70 On acknowledging that the security interest is property, but only by virtue of radial extension of a conceptual category, the
way is cleared to do a critical examination of judgments about the
merits (or demerits) of security. By critical examination, we mean an
assessment of the impact of security, and more particularly the rules
relating to the priority of secured claims, on a basis other than propositional results dictated by an unyielding assertion that security is
property.
This brings us to Revised Article 9. It is likely that the revision
process of the 1990s was the last great opportunity for granting that
secured credit might be usefully conceived of as property, but that it
need not be so for all purposes. It was an opportunity, that is to say, to
acknowledge the property/conveyance metaphor to be precisely
that-a metaphor-no less and certainly no more. 71 The revision
process presented a forum to entertain models other than the prevailing conveyance model in response to legitimate anxiety over the dis68 U.C.C. § 9-609 (2006).
69 Bjerre, supra note 15, at 361. "At work here.. . is a metonymy [where the part
stands for the whole, as in the expression, 'All hands on deck!']: when we speak of a
security interest as property, we understand the right to seize the collateral in terms of
the collateral itself." Id.at n.220 (alteration in original).
70 The phenomenon of radial extension also accounts for the fact that category
members may share little in common with each other.
71 Metaphoric mapping, with the inferential consequences arising from importing entailments to the target domain, allows rational inferences about the target concept. The point to be taken is this: metaphoric reason is, by hypothesis, partial. Since
source and target concepts do not correspond dimension-by-dimension, no one
source concept can fully elaborate a target concept. Multiple metaphors must be
deployed to provide multiple levels of meaning. The failure to recognize that insight
forecloses the introduction of additional source metaphors to enrich meaning, and
hides the differences between source and target concepts. See LAKOFP & JOHNSON,
supra note 35, at 10; see also Knippenberg, supra note 13, at 1571 (making the same
point).
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tributive effects of secured credit on unsecured creditors. The
abiding concern that secured credit, and near-absolute priority afforded properly perfected secured claims, unfairly externalized risk
(yielding distributive injustice) were certainly raised, and vigorously
so, 7 2 but ultimately were dismissed by the drafters without much pause
and certainly without much consideration. 73 In the end, security remained property absolutely. The opportunity for law transformation
at the direct conceptual level has thus come and gone. However, the
wholesale embracement of the traditional property-based account of
security in the revision does not foreclose further consideration within
the perimeters established and dictated by that model, as we turn to
next.
C.

The Conveyance Model, Nemo Dat, and the Consequences for the
Credit Community

To call the security interest "property" is to import entailments,
or epistemic consequences, associated with that legal category. Those
entailments are the basis for the irresistible property priority of secured claims that dominated the Article 9 revision process. In this
section, we detail some of the entailments allied with the legal category property, as well as consideration of their consequential significance for secured credit.
A familiar metaphor structures our understanding of property in
the most elemental manner. Both the historical and contemporary
system of American property law rest squarely on the metaphor of
72 In at least academic circles, the process was something of a showdown on these
matters. Proposals designed to ameliorate or annul the distributive effects on unsecured creditors came from both predictable sources and strange bedfellows. See
Bebchuck & Fried, supra note 8, at 899-900; Warren, supra note 16, at 323-25.
73 See supra note 17 and accompanying text; see also Steven L. Harris & Charles W.
Mooney,Jr., How Successful Was the Revision of UC.C. Article 9: Reflections of the Reporters,
74 CHi.-KcNT L. REv. 1357, 1358-60 (1999) (suggesting a sensitivity on the part of the
Revised Article 9 Drafting Committee to the interests of unsecured creditors). ProfessorJanger provides an exceptional treatment of the events and discourse of the revision meetings. See generally Janger, supra note 2. In that article, he describes two
fundamental kinds of reform in the revision effort. One he characterizes as reform
aimed at "simplicity," the other at "safety." See id. at 573-74, Reforms of the first type
had in mind the ease and certainty with which secured creditors might go about their
business. For example, long-standing technical matters that have plagued the filing
system were addressed. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Why the Debtor's State of Incorporation
Should Be the ProperPlacefor Article 9 Filing: A Systems Analysis, 79 MINN. L. REv. 577,
593-619 (1995). It appears there was much consensus on those issues. Janger, supra
note 2, at 573. Not so, the issues and accompanying proposals concerning distributive
justice and the priority of secured creditors. Id.
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debtor, with its value detached and relocated in the secured
78
creditor.
An inescapable imperative emerges from the metaphor of ownership as a bundle of sticks or (the less whimsical) bundle of rights.
Once dealt out of the bundle, property rights cannot be dispensed
from the same bundle a second time. This ordinance finds expression
in the proverbial commercial law maxim, nemo dat quod habet. The
ruling on the matter is not arbitrary, but follows necessarily from understanding property according to the bundle metaphor. 79
On the coventional property-based account of security, the security agreement is more deed than contract.8 0 The value stick passes out
of the bundle and into the coffers of the secured creditor, where it is
irreclaimably beyond the reach of unsecured creditors,8s both those
who voluntarily transacted with the debtor (e.g., trade creditors), and
those upon whom the claim was foisted (tort creditors).82 Since the
security interest is property, while the interests of unsecured creditors
are not, the value deeded away is gone. Thus ends any priority battle
between secured and unsecured creditors. If this is the beginning and
78 See Knippenberg, supra note 15, at 1972.
79 See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing entailments and metaphoric mapping).
80 Harris & Mooney, supra note 2, at 2051-52; see also Knippenberg, supra note
15, at 1972 (suggesting that the security agreement is a kind of deed because it is
more an instrument of conveyance than an instrument setting the rights and obligations of the parties); Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 8, at 2287 (discussing the
consistency of the security interest with the conveyance metaphor, which allows for a
physical transfer of lien rights from the debtor to the creditor).
81 See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 8, at 2262.
82 This is the essence of Professor LoPucki's claim that security cannot be decentlyjustified. He submits that unsophisticated, unsecured creditors are ignorant of
the risks of secured credit, and so do not bargain meaningfully with the debtor who
has encumbered his assets. LoPucki, supra note 8, at 1916-20. Tort claimants, of
course, do not bargain with tortious debtors, nor do they have the opportunity to
decline to "transact" with the debtor from whom they seek recovery. See generally id. at
1896-1902 (noting that a substantial portion of unsecured debt of persons filing
bankruptcy was owed to "reluctant" creditors such as tort claimants). An early sighting of the proposition that tort claimants should be awarded priority over secured
creditors can be found in Christopher M.E. Painter, Note, Tort CreditorPriority in the
Secured Credit System: Asbestos Times, the Worst of Times, 36 S-rAN. L. REv. 1045 (1984).
Others have followed, for example, Rebecca J. Huss, Revamping Veil Piercingfor All
Limited Liability Enterprises: Forcingthe Common Law Doctrine into the Statutory Age, 70 U.
CIN. L, REV. 95 (2001); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors,
91 COLUM. L. RE,. 1565 (1991). But see Knippenberg, supra note 15, at 1980-82 (arguing that LoPucki's insistence on tort victim priority can be seen as a shift in management responsibility from the debtor to the secured creditor, which, while arguably

justified, must first be defended on some explicit normative basis).
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end of analysis, then the first-in-time priority rule that squeezes out
unsecured creditors is both inevitable and intractable.
The consequences that attend pronouncing the security interest
property are also the sum and substance of the so-called "propertybased defense" of security.8 On creation of the security interest,
value in the collateral is conveyed to the secured creditor such that it
is no longer accessible to other creditors seeking to satisfy their
claims. Prevailing outcome-required analysis premised on the extant
conveyance model and its chief feature, the principle of nemo dat, assures the first-in-time priority rule that favors the secured creditor, but
there is more.
Starting from the implicit, but still unsubstantiated assumption
that the credit is good, the more the better, and that secured credit is
best, the proliferation of rules to enhance security became paramount
in the development of the commercial law over the past half-century.
For this to occur, creation and perfection of the security interest certainly had to be "facilitated."84 More to the point, however, the security interest would be "property," bestowing it with a set of powerful
political and emotive associations, not to mention a commanding priority unique to property.8 5 Further, Article 9 would abstain from providing a definition of personal property and fixtures, the stuff to
which the security interest might attach, so that an endless parade of

83 See generally Harris & Mooney, supra note 2, at 2025-37 (arguing that giving
security for debt neither harms nor increases the risk to a debtor's unsecured creditors); Stephen J. Harris and Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Measuring the Social Costs and
Benefits and Identifying the Victims of SubordinatingSecurity Interests in Bankruptcy, 82 CoR
NELL L. REv. 1349, 1356-70 (1997) (arguing that subordinating secured credit to unsecured claims would materially reduce the availability of credit to parties that need it
most such as distressed businesses). As noted earlier, security has been assailed both
on the grounds that it is inefficient in a macroeconomic sense, and simply unfair to
unsecured creditors. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also Theodore Eisenberg, The Undersecured Creditorin Reorganizations and the Nature of Security, 38 VAND. L.
REv. 931, 953-55 (1985) (noting that a secured creditor's interest should be regarded
as no more than a priority claim limited to the value of the collateral).
84 See supra note 5 (noting the vision of the drafters of Article 9 was to make
secured credit cheap and easy). This was likewise the continuing (and expanded)
mission of the revision process. See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The
Article 9 Study Committee Report: Strong Signals and Hard Choices, 29 IDAHO L. Rv. 561,
577-80 (1993) (discussing the recommendations made in the 1992 report of the
U.C.C. Permanent Editorial Board's Article 9 Study Committee, for which the authors
also served as reporters).
85 See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text; see also infra note 109 and accompanying text (noting that security interests constitute prioritized property).
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newly emerging interests might become collateral, and, thereby, succumb to the secured party's property claim.8 6
As more interests are promoted to the status of "property," more
interests become available for hypothecation. The security interestconclusively understood to be property in those interests 87-is
freighted with all the implications associated with property. 88 An expanding list of collateral, in turn, invites more "cross-boundary" conflicts 89 and further intrusion upon the status and interests of
unsecured creditors. 9 0 Because the interests of the latter are perceived as less than property, however, they stand no chance in the
battle for assets with the perfected security interest. All conflicts are
86 The scope of Revised Article 9, like its predecessor, continues to reach any
transaction, regardless of form, that creates a consensual security interest in personal
property or fixtures, unless explicitly excluded from the article. U.C.C. § 9102(12) (B) (2006) and § 9-104 (1972); U.C.C. § 9-109(a) (2006) and § 9-102 (1972).
Although the basic scope of the rule remained intact, the revision expanded the
scope of Article 9 in several key respects, including the sale of most payment intangibles (§ 9-109(a)(3)) and elimination of the exclusion for deposit accounts (defined in § 9-102(a) (29)). Likewise, Revised Article 9 also covers sales of promissory
notes (defined in U.C.C. § 9-102 (a) (65)), largely included to facilitate securitization
of this type of instrument. Furthermore, the scope of Article 9 does reach some real
estate-like interests. Fixtures, as noted, have always been available as collateral (see
U.C.C. § 9-334), and obligations may be used as collateral though those obligations
might themselves be secured by real estate interests. U.C.C. § 9-109(b). In addition,
an Article 9 security interest can be taken in the non-Article 9 security device (mortgage or lien) that secures the obligation, provided the obligation and device are "coupled." U.C.C. § 9-109 cmt. 7. At the same time, personal property is nowhere defined
in Article 9. Simply put, if a thing is not realty, it is personalty, and its value may be
conveyed in the form of a security interest.
87 Professor Schroeder makes the case that the drafters of the U.C.C., in disclaiming the relevance of title and embracing, instead, the bundle of rights paradigm, restated the antiquated relationship of property to things-property reified: "[The
legal realists rejected the notion of title, not because it was unitary or objective, but
precisely because it was insufficiently physical

. .

. They demanded that not only

goods-which are by definition physical things-but also acts and words must become
tangible." Schroeder, Bundle-O-Stix, supra note 64, at 310. Moreover, "[iln order to
make property tangible, the drafters identified property in the good with the good
itself. Property interests in the good are made, as nearly as possible, equivalent to
sensuous contact with the good." Id.
88 See infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
89 See supra note 10.
90 See also LoPucki, supra note 11, at 18 ("The effect [of simplifying secured
credit] was to increase dramatically the proportion of encumbered assets in the American economy."). The impact of expanding secured credit was apparent in bankruptcy liquidations where distribution to unsecured creditors was significantly
reduced. Id.
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where the interests of unsecured creditors are not dignified with the
classification "property," there are no cross-boundary conflicts that are
not instantly resolved simply because security is property and the competing unsecured interest is not.
Finally, cross-border conflicts would be avoided in the realm of
secured credit whether or not the rights and interests of unsecured
creditors were regarded as property. Although enshrined with the
paramount rights of real property, the security interest is not an interest in land. Thus, with its first-in-time priority, it has heretofore been
insulated from scrutiny as a nuisance even of the watered-down variety
that emerged with the shift to the modern economy. 99 In sum, the
security interest as property, unlike a property interest in land, has no
natural enemies. In this, the security interest is property of a special
and exalted sort, presenting a singular example of eating one's cake
and having it to boot.
D. Nemo Dat Gone Mad: Security as a Judgment-ProofingStrategy
Where a debtor either has no assets, or has assets inaccessible to
judgment creditors through execution, that debtor is effectively judgment proof.10 0 There are several strategies by which a debtor may be
rendered judgment proof, including secured credit, the most ancient-if no longer the most common-method. 10 1 Under that strategy, the debtor issues debt secured by a pervasive lien on its assets in
an amount that immediately or seasonably thereafter exceeds the liquidation value of the encumbered assets, which thus become instantly
inaccessible to unsecured creditors, certainly those without judgments
and even those whose claims have been reduced to judgment. Now,
with no further risks to be incurred, and all external discipline dissipated, the fun begins. 10 2
and accompanying text (discussing the concept of absolute dominion in the context
of indirect invasion).
99 See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
100 LoPucki, supra note 11, at 1 n.4. "The liability system works solely through the
entry and enforcement of money judgments. Debtors can defeat it by rendering
themselves judgment proof." Id. at 14.
101 LoPucki identifies and describes four judgment-proofing strategies: secured
debt strategies, ownership strategies (by shuffling assets to subsidiaries or through
asset securitization), exemption strategies, and foreign haven strategies. Id. at 14-38.
More recently, "on-shore" havens might be added to the list. See John K. Eason, Home
from the Islands: Domestic Asset Protection Trust Alternatives Impact TraditionalEstate and
Gift Tax Planning, 52 FLA. L. REV. 41, 53-63 (2000).
102 See Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 45,
47-54 (1986) (discussing the suboptimal incentives in terms of exercising ordinary
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externalize virtually all of the costs of insolvency. 10 6 This is most obvious in, but not necessarily limited to, the case of tort liability.10 7 Exacerbated by the divergent motivations that sometimes emerge from the
separation of ownership and management, t01Article 9 arguably facilitates the extension of more credit than is optimal, at least from the
perspective of distributional fairness. The statute's embracement of
full priority, and the concomitant subordination of unsecured claims,
makes this a logical but, as we hope to show, not a necessary, result.
In its present form, secured credit is manifestly an ideal construct
by which to judgment-proof debtors. The hegemony of the conveyance model, and the corresponding principle of nemo dat, together,
ensure priority for perfected secured creditors as surely and inexorably as night follows day. In other words, in the grand scheme of
things, the property-based tenets on which security has come to be
106

See Bebchuck & Fried, supra note 8, at 899-900 (explaining that the full prior-

ity for secured claims, when combined with the distortions already created by limited
liability, leads firms "to underinvest in precautions and overinvest in risky activities
that externalize harm to other parties").
107 G. Eric Brunsted, Bankruptcy and the Problems of Economic Futility: A Theory on the
Unique Role of Bankruptcy Law, 55 Bus. LAW.499, 539 (2000) (suggesting that a firm's
inability to pay unsecured claims is more detrimental to tort victims than trade creditors); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The EssentialRole of OrganizationalLaw,
110 YALE L.J. 387, 431 (2000) ("Tort victims have no control over the type of legal
entity that injures them. Consequently, to make the amount recovered by a tort victim depend upon the legal form of the organization responsible for the tort is to
permit the externalization of accident costs, and indeed to invite the choice of legal
entity to be governed in important part by the desire to seek such externalization.");
Charles W. Hendricks, Offering Tort Victims Some Solace: Why States Should Incorporate a
20% Set-Aside Into Their Versions of Article 9, 104 COM. LJ. 265, 268-71 (1999) (urging
adoption by the states of the Warren "carve-out" proposal); Janger, supra note 2, at
606 (pointing out that the availability of secured credit, when coupled with limited
liability, could seriously erode the effectiveness of the tort liability system); Note,
Switching Priorities:Elevating The Status of Tort Claims in Bankruptcy in Pursuitof Optimal
Deterrence,116 HARv.L. REv. 2541, 2561-62 (2003) (making the case that the elevation
of tort claims in bankruptcy would alleviate the externalization of liability in both
liquidations and reorganizations).
108 See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, DirectorPrimacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 547, 568 (2003) (pointing out that shareholders of
public companies are not in a position, legally or practically, to monitor and regulate
the decisions of the day-to-day managers of the firm); Lawrence Ponoroff, Enlarging
the Bargaining Table: Some Implications of the Corporate Stakeholder Model for FederalBankruptcy Proceedings, 23 CAP. U. L. REv. 441, 484-86 (1994) (discussing the sometimes
incongruent interests of owners and professional managers in relation to initiation of
bankruptcy). For a more general discussion of the agency problems inherent in the
divergent interests of corporate managers and shareholders, see Elizabeth Chorvat,
You Can't Take it With You: BehavioralFinanceand CorporateExpatriations,37 U.C. DAvis
L. REv. 453, 485-87 (2003).
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understood create systematic opportunities, if not actual incentives,
for judgment-proofing.
Indeed, judgment-proofing through secured credit is simply the
outcome of the ordinary operation of priority rules based on property
ownership. Secured creditors have an ownership interest in the
debtor's assets because the security is denominated to be "property,"
while judgment and other unsecured creditors own no property.
Thus, the priority battle is over before it is pitched. 10 9
III.

Sic UTERE

Tuo, UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS

While there is, and has been, much criticism of the priority
awarded secured credit, 110 none, so far as we are aware, has proposed
a rubric by which misuse of security might be arrested other than by
challenging the basic precepts of the conveyance model-an exercise
of interesting intellectual interest, but no more likely to have a practical effect than a knight on horseback is likely to do damage to a windmill by charging it with a lance. In this Part, therefore, we propose a
rubric for redressing the use of security as a judgment-proofing
scheme that operates squarely within the boundaries of the property
model.
The approach we advance is suggested by the very decree that has
declared security to be property, as emphatically confirmed in Revised
Article 9. That is, with property rights come property responsibilities.
In the law relating to real property, the very law that has come to
structure the contemporary understanding of Article 9, one way in
which property responsibility is imposed is through the law of nuisance, a tort that polices unreasonable uses of land. It is our belief
that the doctrine of nuisance similarly offers a workable and conceptually compatible model for policing the misuse of security. To explore this possibility, an excursus into the law of nuisance is in order
as follows.
Nuisance law' is rooted in profoundly held convictions about a
landowner's unqualified right to prevent physical intrusion upon his
109 In fact, we think it inaccurate to refer to a "priority dispute" in this context at
all, as we believe that phrase implies the ordering of distribution among like claimants. Secured creditors own the collateral; judgment creditors have no cognizable
property, so there is no real dispute about priority that can in fact arise between them.
110 See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
111 The word, nuisance, has its etymology in the Latin, nocumentum, from which it
found its way to become the French, nuisant, the present participle of nuire, which
means "[t]o be hurtful, injurious, or prejudicial ... to jeopardize, to harm; to stand in
the way, to be an obstacle or hindrance." THE NEW CASSELL'S FRENCH DICTIONARY 516
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person of the trespasser," 6 but entry in the form of some tangible
thing wielded by or under the trespasser's control will do. 1 7 Both
constitute physical invasion by the trespasser, one directly and one
indirectly.118
At a certain point, one strays from the prototype category member (physical entry of the trespasser) altogether into the derivative category "nuisance." 1 9 In conventional terms, trespass is distinguished
from nuisance in that the former involves physical intrusion, while the
latter does not.120 The conceptual demarcation is quite distinct, even
if the boundary often blurs owing to a seemingly crude distinction
that conceives of large objects as instruments of trespass, but small

116 STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 75, § 7.1, at 411. Originally, the distinction
between trespass and nuisance turned on the characterization of the physical intrusion as direct or indirect. Direct invasion constituted trespass, while indirect invasion
constituted nuisance. The characterization was necessitated by the old forms of action. Trespass was the appropriate action for direct physical invasion, but offered no
remedy for indirect physical invasion, which, instead, was left to an action on the case.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 111, at 622. The distinction between direct and indirect
invasion atrophied with the disappearance of the old forms of action. Id. The difference between the torts thereafter was cast in terms of the nature of the interest to be
protected. Trespass disturbed exclusive possession of land, while nuisance was an affront to its use and enjoyment. Id.
117 "Instrumentalities that can cause trespass are generally objects . .. that have
size and weight, whereas nuisances are generally caused by 'nonphysical' forces such
as noise, odors, and vibration." STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 75, § 7.1, at 412; see
also KEFTON ET AL., supra note 111, at 619-20 (defining nuisance as "an interference
with the use and enjoyment of the land" and providing examples of the "different
ways and combinations of ways" in which this interest may be invaded).
118 Another important imaginative device of rationality is metonymy. Whereas
metaphor is a matter of understanding one concept or entity in terms of another concept, metonymic reasoning entails one entity standingfor another. In the expression,
"all hands on deck," for instance, the hand stands for the whole sailor. LAKOFF &
JOHNSON, supranote 35, at 35-40. In the same way, unprivileged entry in the form of
objects, projectiles, wandering animals, and so forth under the indirect trespasser's
control constitute trespass. See SToEBuCK & WHITMAN, supra note 75, § 7.1, at 411 and
accompanying notes.
119 This is not intended as a casual use of the term, "category," rather, we use it in
the experientialist sense. On the experientialist account, categories are conceptual,
as distinguished from the common objectivist view of categories as naturally occurring, independent of human conceptual categories. LAKOFF, supranote 19, at 266-68.
For the objectivist, by contrast, categories are defined by the inherent properties of
their members and are mind-independent. See supranotes 34-43 and accompanying
text.
120 See supra note 116.
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objects as nuisance-creating agents. 12 1 Much turns on whether the object or objects are visible to the naked eye.' 22
If the agents of nuisance, unlike trespass, do not disturb possession, private nuisance is nevertheless a tort against interests initially
associated with property ownership. 12 3 Traditionally, the interest invaded has been deemed to be the "use and enjoyment" of the land by
the possessor; 124 although providing a workable definition of "use and
enjoyment" 125 (and particularly to do so in terms of property1 26) has
proved to be a challenge. The point to be taken is that the parameters of common law nuisance are not especially well delineated in ap121 See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 75, § 7.1, at 412. The distinction between nuisance and trespass based on the size of the instrumentality involved may
seem arbitrary or frivolous at first glance; however, on understanding nuisance and
trespass as conceptual categories, it becomes perfectly sensible. The prototype of the
conceptual category "trespass" is physical intrusion of the trespasser's person. Id.
§ 7.1, at 411. The metaphor, "objects are extensions of the person manipulating
them," admits direct physical intrusion in the form of some instrumentality wielded
by the trespasser into the category, trespass. Intrusion in the form of objects with
insignificant mass is too remote from the central category prototype for category
membership.
122 Dust, insects, and even smoke occupy physical space and have substance, however inconsequential, hut these are generally regarded as nuisance-causing agents,
not instruments of trespass. KEETON ET AL., supra note 111, at 71.
123 Ownership interests protected from private nuisance include interests less than
fee absolute ownership. For instance, tenants for a term, mortgagors in possession
after a foreclosure, even those in adverse possession enjoy interests recognized as protected from nuisance. Id. at 621.
124 This does not, however, define public nuisance, which requires no injury to
real property; instead, public nuisance and private actions for public nuisance arise
on injury to public rights, though such rights might include an injury to real property.
See generally Louise A. Halper, Untanglingthe Nuisance Knot, 26 B.C. ENVrL. AFF. L. REV.
89, 96 (1998) ("The public nuisance action stems from the injury a private use inflicts
on public rights, which may occasionally mean harm to real property owned by the
public, but is more often an injury to common pool resources .
125 According to the Second Restatement of Torts:
"Interest in use and enjoyment" also comprehends the pleasure, comfort
and enjoyment that a person normally derives from the occupancy of land.
Freedom from discomfort and annoyance while using land is often as important to a person as freedom from physical interruption with his use or freedom from detrimental change in the physical condition of the land itself.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D cmt. b (1979).
126 STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 75, § 7.2, at 416 ("How should we define the
property interest that the law of nuisance protects? Is it necessary to say that the
plaintiff has a specifically defined property interest in light, air, and view, as discrete
kinds of 'property,' or should we define the protected property interest more broadly
as use and enjoyment of the land?").
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plication.1 2 7 The formula for stating the action, however, is quite
clear,' 28 and, more important for present purposes, there is little confusion about the essence of nuisance law, which is to address uses of
property that injure the interests of another or a community of others.
The conceptual history of nuisance law begins with the Blackstonian conception of property. 129 It corresponds roughly to contemporary popularly held conceptions of property,13 0 which equate
property to things, land, or personalty, actually owned.'31 This conception has, however, always been inadequate for law, which generally
regards property as describing a relationship between the owner and
the things themselves. In other words, things are not property, rather,
things are merely the subjects of property. 3 2
In any case, Blackstone described property to be "sole and despotic dominion whicl one man claims and exercises over external
things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individ127 KEETON ET AL., supra note 111, at 549-50.
128 According to the Restatement, "[a] private nuisance is a non-trespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)

OF

TORTS § 821D (1979). First, there must be some intentional conduct

that amounts to interference with the use and enjoyment of land. Id. § 822.
The phrase "interest in the use and enjoyment of land" is used ...[by the)
Restatement in a broad sense. It comprehends not only the interests that a
person may have in the actual present use of land for residential, agricultural, commercial, industrial and other purposes, but also his interests in
having the present use value of the land unimpaired by changes in its physical condition.
Id. § 821D cmt. b. Second, there must, indeed, be a resulting interference from that
conduct. Id. § 821F. Third, the interference must result in harm (significantly, the
requirement is satisfied on showing a devaluation of the nuisance victim's property).
Id. § 826. Finally, the interference must be unreasonable. Id.
129 See supra text accompanying note 95.
130

BRUCE A. AcRmAN,PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION

97-100, 113-67

(1977). This is the lay notion of property ownership as dominion over things.
131 See, e.g., Francis S. Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in the Law, 86 U.
PA. L. REv. 691, 691 (1938) ("A layman thinks of property as a man's belongings, or as
the things that a man owns."). The fact is, the 'layman" conceives of property in terms
of objects or things not because the layman is insipid, but because that conception is
perfectly serviceable for the layman's purposes. Id. at 694-95. One might spend a
highly successful lifetime acting in every regard on a concept of the universe that
supposes the sun revolves around the earth like a ball on a string. In the course of the
day for most of us, that conception is as serviceable as any other. A different conceptualization is required only when the other fails to accommodate the endeavor at
hand. See id. at 696 ("Changing culture causes the law to speak with new imperatives,
invigorates some concepts, devitalizes and brings to obsolescence others,").
132 See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 75, § 1.1, at 1.
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Blackstonian notions of unitary ownership of land, with
all of its domineering political associations, implied an equally potent
corollary: "[A]bsolute dominion.. . conferred on an owner the power
to prevent any use of his neighbor's land that conflicted with his own
quiet enjoyment."' 3 4 Of course, stated in the negative, the same principle meant circumscribing the rights of owners to develop or use
3 5
their land in contradiction of the principle of absolute dominion.,
In an economy centered on land ownership, that contradiction
presented relatively few actual conflicts. 13 6 Direct invasion was dealt
with by trespass, and obnoxious uses short of invasion that interfered
with quiet enjoyment were circumscribed as nuisances.' 37 Nineteenth-century economic developments, however, meant novel and
expanding uses of land that began to produce more nettlesome conflicts. 138 Gradually, the contradiction between corresponding rights
and obligations of property ownership was not only exposed, but
brought to highly problematic relief. The indirect invasion that necessarily attended novel uses were, of course, instantly met with the law
of nuisance, which proscribed strictly any interference with use and
enjoyment. Strict liability for nuisance meant the costs of remedying

ual .

133 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 112, at *2.
134 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at
31 (1997) (footnotes omitted). For Blackstone, property owners had to desist from
even lawful uses that offended the use and enjoyment of neighboring owners, upon
whom "it is incumbent ... to find some other place to do that act, where it will be less
offensive." Id. (quoting 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 112, at *217-18). According to
Vandevelde, the two essential components of Blackstone's conception were the presence of a physical thing, which might be the object of property, and the notion that
ownership of that thing was exclusive and absolute. Vandevelde, supra note 25, at
331.
135 It is a matter of the "entitlement to make noise versus the entitlement to have
silence, the entidement to pollute versus the entitlement to breathe clean air." Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral,85 HARv. L. REV. 1089, 1090-91 (1972).

136 See Halper, supra note 124, at 101 ("While there may be cross-boundary annoyances, in an agrarian economy, where land is wealth, not many land uses conflict.
Those that do can be subjected to an 'act at your peril' rule of strict liability, without
much damage to the economy." (footnotes omitted)).
137 Id. at 100.
138 As professor Halper explains:
[N]ew kinds of active uses, dynamic, voracious and large-scale, came to swallow up land and people. Those uses often, virtually always, conflicted with
the old ones. They involved speed and machinery and emissions and smells
and discharges and noise and steam and the plethora of other "less salubrious consequences" of industrial and extractive enterprises.
Id. at 101 (footnotes omitted).
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deprive nuisance doctrine of its property heritage, 14 4 nevertheless the
conception of property as connoting absolute dominion, comprehending freedom from offending uses by neighboring property owners, was simply incompatible with industrial development.
The transformation from agrarian to industrial economy also saw
erosion of the political and economic importance of solitary ownership of land. Unitary ownership of anything was exploded into fragmented rights and relations by Hohfeld 1 4 5 These could be divided
and subdivided, distributed and redistributed, or "even made to disap46
pear as if by magic ....
Moreover, the very definition of property, theretofore securely
anchored in inherited associations with land or other things, was
forced from its object-ownership moorings.14 7 The legal category
"property" was suddenly pressed into service to govern an array of incorporeal rights and interests which supplanted land in economic significance in an industrial, capitalistic economy.' 48 The universe of
property expanded enormously to the degree that some observers
144 See Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: CorrectiveJustice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 74 (1979) (discussing the weakness of utilitarian considerations in failing to explicitly recognize antecedent or natural rights that the law was
not called upon to create).
145 See Wesley N. Hohfeld, FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning II, in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND
OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 65, 67 (Walter W. Cook ed., 1923). It might be more accurate to
say Hohfeld chronicled the explosion rather than precipitated it. Professor Jeanne
Schroeder, who offers an extended treatment of the bundle of sticks metaphor, declares that on unveiling his bundle analysis, Hohfeld wrote the epitaph commemorating the already dead "ancestral" concept of property. Schroeder, Bundle-O-Stix, supra
note 64, at 239-40. Hohfeld's familiar recharacterization of property as a set of legal
relations, together with A.M. Honore's contributions to the bundle of rights model,
are analyzed and critiqued in J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43
UCLA L. REv. 711 (1996).
146 Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NoMos XXII: PROPERTY, 69,
69-70 (J. Roland Pennock &John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
147 See also Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL
L. REV. 531, 536 (2005) (discussing early, value-based views on property and the absence of such views from modern theory).
148 These are the "capitalized assets" that are the hallmark of a modern industrial
market-stock ownership, copyrights, patents, good will and the like. Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. REv. 8, 12 (1927). Grey observes:
The transformation of a preindustrial economy of private proprietors
into an industrial economy ... presupposes that the entrepreneurs, financiers, and lawyers who carry the process through have the imagination to
liberate themselves from the imprisoning concept of property as the simple
ownership of a thing by an individual person. They must be able to design
new forms of finance and control for enterprise, which can take maximum
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predicted that virtually every interest or right threatened to lay claim
4
to that status, diluting the concept to the point of meaninglessness.' -1
The emergent bundle metaphor defined property without conceptual reference to unitary control and dominion over things. It described a set of self-sufficient rights and usages no different, perhaps,
from other legal rights. When property law principles are indistinguishable from those of other doctrinal systems, it seems to deprive
property of the status of a distinct legal category.
The perceived disintegration of property into a bundle of sticks,
with its potential for fragmented ownership, might also be said to
render the general concept of ownership meaningless. Where sticks
are held by several, who is the owner? What is more, if the concept of
property requires no reference to a physical thing owned, the way is
clear to declare anything of value to be property. Then again, if everything is property or can be the subject of property, then, perhaps
nothing is property and property ceases to be an important legal
1 50

category.

However that may be, the report of the death of property was
premature.15 ' As a legal category, property has by no means lost its
power to decide disputes and it does so with mundane regularity. The
oppressive property priority awarded secured claims offers a stunning
example. Under a proposition-based program which resolves legal isadvantage of ... forms that fractionate traditional ownership and that create
claims remote from tangible objects.
Grey, supra note 146, at 75-76.
149 "The protection of value rather than things ... greatly broadened the purview
of property law. Any valuable interest potentially could be declared the object of
property rights. This . . . was a development that threatened to place the entire
corpus of American law in the category of property." Vandevelde, supra note 25, at
329.
150 In Thomas Grey's words, "w~e have gone... in less than two centuries, from a
world in which property was a central idea mirroring a clearly understood institution
to one in which it is no longer a coherent or crucial category in our conceptual
scheme. The concept of property and the institution of property have disintegrated."
Grey, supra note 146, at 74.
151 "[P]roperty as an economic and legal practice continues to flourish. Property
concepts have not come crashing down in the face of this arcane, arid, and acontextual legal argument. The Hohfeldian approach refuses to analyze contemporary property qua property on the grounds that property is dead as an analytical category. The
marketplace, however, needs to account for property and continues to build the protective belt of auxiliaries." Schroeder, Bundle-O-Stix, supra note 64, at 300; see also Bell
& Parchomovsky, supra note 147, at 531 (suggesting that the "bundle of sticks" metaphor is obsolete and proposing a unified theory of property predicated on the insight
that property law is organized around creating and defending the value inherent in
stable ownership).
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sues by recourse to conventional categories, to designate an interest
152
property is not a thing to be taken lightly.
Likewise, then, nuisance doctrine remains intact as well. To be
sure, breasting the winds of changing conceptions of property certainly left a different nuisance doctrine than that which absolutely
protected land ownership. But if the right to use and enjoyment of
property without interference no longer enjoys its former absolute dominion and glory, nuisance remains a property watchdog and its application to security conceived as property is where we turn attention
next.
IV.

NuISANCE DOCTRINE AS A RUBRIC TO CONSTRAIN THE MISUSE OF
SECURED CREDIT-PUTFING A STOP TO JUDGMENT-PROOFING

For present purposes, we are neither challenging the prevailing
property model nor proposing an alternative conceptualization of security. t 53 What we would argue is only that if all of the dimensions of
the now accepted source concept "property" are imprinted on the target concept "security," there is ample justification to warrant limiting
the secured creditor's legal rights (and remedies) when the exercise
of those rights, understood as property rights, interfere unreasonably
with the competing rights of a community of others-that is to say,
when the security interest becomes a nuisance. Put another way, the
rights of secured creditors as property owners should not exceed unqualifiedly the rights of other property owners in the fashion that the priority rules of Article 9, operating in isolation, would demand.
As we have pointed out in the previous Part, the protection of
property rights, while expansive, is not absolute. In the real property
context, when the use of one's property interferes with the reasonable
enjoyment of adjacent property, nuisance law can be invoked to constrain the offending use (i.e., to limit the otherwise unfettered rights
152 See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
153 This is something we have, however, done in the past, at least in the context of
a bankruptcy proceeding. See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 8, at 2289-96.
Once it is recognized that the security interest is not a thing that is property, but rather
represents a dynamic relationship that for some purposes we have come to understand conceptually through the prism of the property metaphor, we (and more im-

portantly courts) are no longer consigned irrevocably to understand the security
interest as property, with all of the entailments associated with that concept, for all
purposes. In essence, then, we are freed to bring to bear competing conceptualizations that more accurately, and more fairly, characterize the relationship between the
debtor, the secured party, and others with a cognizable economic stake in that relationship. Although a tantalizing prospect, our assertion in this Article is far less intrepid than that.
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methodology cannot only be
of ownership). Analogically, the same
but we would maintain needs
applied to an Article 9 property interest,
appropriately these rights
to be so employed in order to reconcile
and to the same property. Thus,
with the rights of other claimants in
the Article 9 security interest, and
the question becomes when does
on
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to the point that the security
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to say that secured credit is benefigate social utility? In other words,
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cial to the well being of the commercial
of that assertion are explored.
and until the limits on the truth
in Article 9 did not render
The ideation of security as property
non-Code doctrines, which,
wholly irrelevant the application of other,
be pressed into service to
might
proceeding from the property model,
There is, further, a pragmatic
alter this result in extraordinary cases.
application of these docas well as a normative value in harmonizing
interest as property, and it is
trines with the concept of the security
metaphor-itself a species of prophere that we believe the nuisance
say that is not only consonant with
erty law-may have something to
of security as property, but actuthe prevailing positive law abstraction
conceptual level.
ally flows directly from it at the core
amounts to nuisance
We make no claim that judgment-proofing
we advocate neither the exin the conventional sense. In addition,
to embrace injury to intangipansion of the tort of nuisance generally
by analogy, nor otherwise
ble interests in specific personalty
of action to limit use of personal
recommend the creation of a cause
cases. Rather, we believe simply that
property, including security in all
most notably judgment-proofcertain misuses of security, including
nuisance. We further maintain
ing, belong in the conceptual category
contemporary reasons to put it
that there are good historical and
which
has been indicted in the literature
there.15 4 Judgment-proofing
that
1 5 What we offer here is a conceptual redux
describes its costs.
in a few recognizable, doctrinally
assembles and restates those costs
stipulated terms.
in two ways: First,
The experiment contributes to the discourse
under relatively
gathered
are
156 Secthe threats posed by judgment-proofing
associations.
widely familiar
determinate markers that elicit
text.
154 See infra note 175 and accompanying
text.
accompanying
and
100-03
155 See supra notes
from the general debate
judgment-proofing
156 The idea here is to disentangle
supra note 7 and
of secured credit generally. See
over the worth of the institution
raised by secured
questions
fairness and efficiency
accompanying text (summarizing
for discrete
relocated
is
it,
put
we
as
mad
dat gone
credit). Judgment-proofing, nemo
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ond, distillation and consignment of judgment-proofing to the nuisance domain supplies a manageable doctrinal response to this
practice and a remedial opportunity in more or less conventional
bankruptcy (arguably non-conventional state) law terms.'15 7 In short,
understanding judgment-proofing in terms of nuisance doctrine in service of meaning introduces doctrinal demarcation and response manageability through a simple heuristic structure. With that, we turn to
our explication of nuisance as a conceptual category.
There are doubtless a number of ways in which the conceptual
category "nuisance" might be explained and described.1 58 We believe,
however, that among them, nuisance might usefully be understood as
a radial category, just as we have suggested that the concept "property" can be understood as a radial category.' 59 Moreover, an account
of nuisance as a radial category furnishes an explanatory perspective
that sheds an illuminating glint to highlight our purposes in this Part.
Specifically, it is our claim that judgment-proofing is likewise a conceptually natural member of that radial category, and we propose
therefore the application of nuisance tenets in that context to enable
systematic decision response management.
A single prototype or best example of the conceptual category
nuisance is difficult to identify, but none is required. Any of a number would do. Our own informal inquiries suggest one serviceable
possibility, namely, the discharge of dust 160 from one property for the
landowner's recreational use which travels to neighboring property
analysis on an abuse basis. Simply put, the injuries worked by judgment proofing are
reassembled under the few household terms from nuisance. The nature of those
threats is thus understood on conceptual grounds on which there is accord.
157 The strategy is to provide decision makers an accessible, off-the-rack means of
capturing and killing judgment-proofing schemes. Nuisance is long-standing and
conceptually seasoned, and its essential mission largely a matter of agreement. See
supra notes 129-52 and accompanying text. Nuisance doctrine is therefore readily
and widely available to decision makers.
158 See supra note 54 and accompanying text (noting that cognitive linguistics has
identified several conceptual category types).
159 Space does not permit a rigorous discussion of nuisance as a radial category,
but a detailed account is unnecessary for present purposes. The treatment of property
as radial category offered in Part II.B should serve to demonstrate how the analysis
proceeds.
160 While our choice of a central case is based upon our informal survey of our
colleagues, the factual instantiations in the cases are consistent with that choice and
offer a wide array of examples. The one we selected seemed to spring irresistibly to
the minds of most when asked to pick a best example. The other most common
responses elicited on asking for a common or most common nuisance were: barking
dogs, funeral homes, rank or obnoxious odors, smoke, and noise. Responses included all, and they are easily elicited.
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and devalues it. The stories available in the case law suggest a host of
related radial members, and also the point at which extension fails.
They suggest as well some of the most salient features which define
the prototype.
Offending activity that produces substances short of dust or the
like is, within both the conceptual and legal categories, nuisance. For
instance, smoke is regarded as a nuisance-causing substance where it
crosses property lines to disturb neighbors or devalue their property. 16 1 Considerable extension from the prototype is tolerated:
odors, noise, and light have all been ruled agents of nuisance. 6 2
Gases, odors, even noise and light, are not conceptually problematic, or not seriously so-they are simply metaphoric extensions of
dust or other substances. But other activities have been declared a
nuisance within the legal category, though they produce nothing perceptible, at the literal or nonliteral level that journeys to adjacent
property. For instance, an undertaking business is a nuisance-causing
activity, but produces nothing easily understood as crossing property
lines. 163 That radial extension is obviously acceptable, from which we
conclude sufficient resemblance to the category prototype.
The implication may be that resemblance to the best case in that
particular is essential neither for membership in the conceptual category "nuisance" nor, for that matter, the conventional legal category.
It may also be that, assuming enough resemblance to the prototype on
other grounds, marginal resemblance by metaphoric extension will
do. We believe two features or traits seem to identify the central case:
first, the use of something one owns within sufficient proximity, literally or metaphorically, so as to injure something belonging to another. 16 4 Second, there is no good reason for the offending use; that
is, the good, if any, that is derived from the offending use is outweighed by the corresponding injury to neighboring interests. 16 5
161 See Holman v. Athens Empire Laundry Co., 100 S.E. 207, 210 (Ga. 1919) (stating that smoke constitutes a nuisance when it "produce[s] a visible, tangible, and

appreciable injury to property.").
162 Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 516 A.2d 990, 1002 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (stating
that "[a]ll tangible intrusions, such as noise, odor, or light fall within the realm of
nuisance"); see also supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text (differentiating nuisance from trespass in conceptual terms).
163 Howard v. Etchieson, 310 S.W.2d 473, 474 (Ark. 1958).
164 The best example here may be pecuniary loss from visible, physical injury to
land. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 111, at 627.
165 The balance schema is widely distributed across any array of concepts. For an
account (and critique) of the balance schema in the law, where it becomes a specialized version of propositional reasoning, see JOHNSON, supra note 36, at 90-96.
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certain uses of security and
Turning to the relationship between
property" (derived from the dustthe category prototype, the "use of
is shared by the deployment of
creating activity in the central case)
literal level. In the case of the catesecurity to judgment-proof at the
ownership) is sufficiently proxigory best example, the interest (land
be
the nuisance-creating conduct to
mate (literally) to the place of
of the secured creditor's
devalued by that conduct. The proximity
established metaphorically. At
unsecured creditor neighbors is easily
of unsecured creditors is within
the nonliteral level, the community
interest wielded to judgmentinjury-causing range of the security
6
1 6 The presence of an interest susceptible to injury
proof the debtor.
and the
by the category prototype
16 7
is a feature shared at the literal level
interest.
the
devaluation of
unsecured creditor, as is the
discussion purposes, the nuiIn the prototype we described for
has value only to the party
sance-causing conduct is recreational-it
a
said of secured credit employed as
undertaking it. The same is easily
correspondence is likely literal. It
judgment-proofing scheme-the
find an argument claiming judgwould prove difficult, indeed, to
save the secured party and, perment-proofing is of value to anyone . 6 8
With the aggregate utility of
haps, the debtor's current managers
debated, 69 the use of secured
secured credit generally still very much
of unsecured creditors seems
credit to judgment-proof at the expense
rational, let alone equitable,
difficult to justify on any commercially
failure has been entirely externalbasis. Indeed, once the risk of firm
that promote prudent business deciized, the incentives and controls
their place is substituted a set of
sion making are eschewed, and in
decisions favoring the taking
stimuli and inducements that encourage
if you
are within the sphere of influence,
166 The rights of unsecured creditors
financial
the
are
said,
be
creditors, it might
will, of the secured claim. The unsecured
is, of course, nonliteral.
proximity
The
creditor.
neighbors of the secured
text (pointing out that the rights ofjudg167 See supranote 100 and accompanying
money judgthe debtor is judgment proof). The
ment creditors are worthless where
official
than
more
little
as
be described
ment, standing alone, might
liability,
for
it that the creditor's case
acknowledgement by the authority issuing
is not to say, on the other hand, that
That
made.
is
tort,
or
whether based on contract
crediin some sense the rights of unsecured
a case might not be made for regarding
text
infra
See
or at least a nascent property right.
tors as representing a property right,
accompanying notes 173-74.
from
(suggesting how the debtor may benefit
168 LoPucki, supra note 11, at 14-30
(distext
accompanying
also supra notes 101-02 and
judgment-proofing schemes); see
cussing judgment-proofing strategies).
169 See supra notes 7-8.
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of potendisproportionate to any reasonable assessment
of risk wholly
170
tial return.

of the nature of its
If we hypothesize a borrower that, because
faces a serious risk of insolcurrent and historic business operations,
and unliquidated tort liability
vency due to, for example, contingent
the beginnings of an argument
(e.g., a tobacco company), one sees
of the firm's secured lenders
that the system of prioritization in favor
(i.e. a nuisance-causmight operate as an unreasonable interference
its unsecured creditors who have
ing event) with the property rights of
for the same advantage.
no real or practical opportunity to bargain
full priority, or perhaps another
When this occurs, some limitation of
pull more assets into reach,
other remedy, such as alter ego liability to
such as the notion of
may be called for under suppletory doctrines
fractured corporate strucenterprise liability in the case of artificially
the leveraging through se72
tures1 71 or fraudulent transfer law where
with unreasonably small capital)
firm
the
left
has
cured financing
but, first, a threshold inquiry
We take this question up in Part V below,
interests being invaded
needs to be addressed: namely, are "property" purely contractual in
claims is
at all when the nature of the prejudiced
nature?
justified on one of two baWe believe the answer is clearly "yes,"
in form, the right of unses. First, while perhaps purely nascent
to judgment and secure or
secured creditors to reduce their claims
on the debtor's property is
satisfy those judgments through execution
"property" right than the secured
intrinsically and notionally no less a
which is and always has been
creditor's claim to future property,
were the same rights asclearly recognized in Article 9.173 Second,
most certainly be classified as
signed to secured creditors they would
scope of Article 9. Indeed, Arpersonal property collateral within the
in the classification of things, the
ticle 9 is itself largely an exercise
undertaken to determine
most basic of which is the first inquiry
If not, and not otherwise exwhether the collateral is real estate.
of an interest in the property, is
cluded, the property, and the taking
way, if the rights of such credisubject to Article 9.174 Stated another
had no qualms about including
tors were hypothecated, the drafters
accompanying text.
170 See infta notes 180-81 and
Liability and
Securitizing the Enterprise: Enterprise
171 See, e.g., Katherine D. Kale,
"the
(discussing
20 BANR. DEy. J. 311, 314 (2003)
Transferred Receivables in Bankruptcy,
draw
to
order
in
principles
liability through agency
possibility of imposing enterprise
estate of the bankrupt parent corporation").
the
into
back
transferred receivables
text.
172 See infra note 188 and accompanying
173 U.C.C. § 9-204 (2006).
accompanying text.
174 See supra notes 91-93 and
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them in the taxonomy of personalty and declaring the interest conveyed an Article 9 security interest. Logically, if such rights can be
regarded as property after they are hypothecated, then surely they
must also be so before the interest actually arises.
The predicate for designating a judgment-proofing scheme as a
species of the conceptual category nuisance derives from Grant Gilmore's original observation that security was never designed to permit
borrowers to hypothecate "all that they may ever own in the indefinite
future" to a creditor willing to make a loan that, in light of the risks
175
entailed, should probably never have been made in the first place.
Stated another way, there must be some limiting considerations on
the ability of debtors to overleverage simply because creditors can
overcollateralize. 176 Moreover, the fallout (and bankruptcy bailouts)
witnessed in the wake of the leverage buyout exuberance of the late
1980s is a telling reminder that we cannot count on the discipline of
the market alone to control such excesses. 1 77 Indeed, had the princi-

pals in those transactions known that they might have to bear the risks
and costs associated with their highly speculative investment decisions,
175 1 GILMORE, supra note 4, §7.12, at 248-49. This observation also formed the
basis for the Warren carve-out proposal. See Warren, supra note 16, at 324 (citing
Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605, 627 (1981)).
176 Warren, supra note 16, at 323-34. A more elegant solution, if for no other
reason than that it would have constrained the misuse of secured credit within the
four corners of Article 9 itself, the carve-out proposal went nowhere with the Revised
Article 9 Drafting Committee because of the committee's blind allegiance to the
property/conveyance model of security. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying
text. The assignment of security to the category "property," understanding that category in a conventional rather than a radial or other metaphoric sense, might be lamented, but it cannot be ignored. Our proposal differs then from the carve-out
proposal less in substance and more in approach, as we suggest a rubric for taming
the worst abuses of security within the contours of the prevailing property model.
177 See generally Barry L. Zaretsky, FraudulentTransfer Law as the Arbiter of Unreasonable Risk, 46 S.C. L. REV. 1165, 1180 (1995) (discussing the "inherently risky" nature of
leveraged buyouts). In this classic analysis of the application of fraudulent transfer
law to LBO transactions, Professor Zaretsky pointed out that an LBO lender would
often receive collateral as well as a high interest rate and substantial fees. Id. at 1192.
The risk that this senior collateralized lender would not be repaid was, thus, relatively
small, while the potential profits loomed large. This created an incentive to pursue a
transaction even if there was a relatively high risk of failure. At the same time, however, from the perspective of non LBO creditors, who before the transaction stood to
be repaid in full, the loss upon failure of the enterprise was likely to be substantial
without the corresponding potential reward in the event of success. The act of judgment-proofing a debtor through the issuance of secured debt produces precisely the
same risk/reward premium for the secured lender and risk/reward penalty for unsecured lenders. Id.
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it is unlikely that the credit that fueled many of those transactions
would have been available in the first place.
It is our contention that when full priority rules result in a transfer of value from unsecured creditors to secured creditors, which in
itself we suppose is neither good nor bad, enforcement of these rules
warrant greater scrutiny. Specifically, when this result occurs in any
given situation, the appropriate inquiry is not only whether the phenomenon is theoretically defensible in terms of net social savings or
utility, but also whether it is defensible in the context of fairness inter
se among the parties involved in the transactional dynamics in which
it occurs. It is in this regard that we have suggested that it is not defensible when the all-encompassing security interest has been employed by corporate managers of a distressed entity to leverage the
debtor firm to levels that exceed the liquidation value of the firm and,
thereby, allow management and the principal financer to ignore the
reasonable risks of business failure.
Invariably, this occurs when all of the debtor's available assets
have been hypothecated as collateral; that is, security becomes not
simply-as intended-a vehicle to assure repayment of a debt, but
rather a mechanism for shifting the entire risk of firm collapse to unsecured creditors. In other words, when security becomes a license to
gamble with "other people's money,"1 78 the form has been used to
perpetrate a wrong that cries for a remedy, or, to call into service the
property-based concepts we discussed earlier, the perverse incentives
179
facilitated by full credit prioritization have become a nuisance.
Moreover, when the debtor, or debtor's management, has lost any
raison d'etre to seek the long-term interests of the firm by taking appropriate steps to operate with both reasonable care and ordinary bus178 By "other people's money," we mean specifically, the services and supplies provided by general unsecured creditors and the value to which tort victims would otherwise have been entitled in compensation for their injuries. See Shavell, supra note
102, at 45 ("An injurer will treat liability that exceeds his assets as imposing an effective financial penalty only equal to his assets; an injurer with assets of $30,000, for
example, will treat an accident resulting in liability of $100 000 identically with an
accident resulting in liability of only $30 000.").
179 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 147, at 602-03 (advocating that nuisance
theory should be recast and expanded from one that focuses on interference with
use and enjoyment" to one that regulates directly against uses of property that impair
the value of adjacent property owners). This approach to nuisance is even more directly apposite to our argument inasmuch as secured claims by definition appropriate
value from unsecured claims. While we do not assert that this a basis for interference
with the Article 9 priority rules in every case, we could maintain that it becomes so
when the effect is to appropriate all value and, in so doing, leave unsecured creditors
exposed to unreasonable risks that would not otherwise exist.
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or its remaining assets,
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In our view, the use of secured
radial category nuisance. The redebtor is a striking example of the
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instantly
is
extension
natural
be
to
gard
injures the community
bluntly, the use of security to judgment-proof one but the secured
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bered all or most of its assets with no provision, such as insurance, for
internalizing the reasonably foreseeable risks of its operations. Identification of these circumstances post hoc is a relatively easy matter compared to identification ex ante, but this is a task in which courts
routinely engage; for example, in application of fraudulent transfer
85
law-both in and out of a bankruptcy situation.1
Theoretically, of course, the incurring of secured debt should
never alone cause this circumstance to occur, unless the amount of
the actual debt secured is artificially inflated to deliberately mislead
unsecured creditors, inasmuch as the assets encumbered are simply
traded for the proceeds of the secured loan. That is, the balance
sheet is altered in composition but overall net worth is unaffected. 8 6
But where the debtor is financially unstable and at risk of investing the
loan proceeds ill advisedly, a situation more likely to be present in allasset financing cases simply because the secured lender had the leverage to negotiate such draconian terms as a condition of the credit in
the first place,1 8 7 the externalization of risk to all but the secured
lender is inevitable. Indeed, both the Bankruptcy Code and the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Law recognize as a constructively fraudulent transfer one that leaves the debtor with unreasonably small

185 See infra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
186 This argument has also been raised in response to criticisms of securitizations
and other forms of structured financing transactions as judgment-proofing schema,
namely, that in these deals, assets of one kind are simply exchanged for assets of
another kind in an arm's-length transaction. That is to say, the originator will receive
proceeds equal in value to the assets sold, thus not diminishing the value of the originator's estate. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 12-16 (arguing that only if the
originator disposes of the proceeds is there judgment-proofing; securitization in and
of itself is not a judgment-proofing technique). One response to Schwarcz's argument is that securitization, while not itself sufficient to judgment-proof a firm, is a
useful component of a judgment-proofing technique: first securitize, then distribute
the proceeds to claimants. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The IrrefutableLogic ofJudgment Proofing: A Reply to ProfessorSchwarcz, 52 STAN. L. REV. 55, 59 (1999). The same logic applies
in the case of secured loans. See infra note 187.
187 In the case of larger companies, where there is a separation of ownership and
management, agency issues further elevate the risk of imprudent use of the funds
because of management's personal incentive to make high payoff, but high risk, investments that may not be in the long-term best interests of the company. See supra
note 108 and accompanying text. This is particularly so if the borrower firm was experiencing financial difficulties to begin with, which, in turn, is precisely the kind of
situation in which secured lenders will have the motivation and the leverage to effectively encumber all the debtor owns.
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capital in relation to actual or anticipated business activities in which
188
the debtor is currently engaged or plans to engage.
Of course, to sustain the fraudulent transfer analogy, the assets
remaining after the security transfer must not only be unreasonably
small, but what was returned to the debtor in exchange for the security interest must be of less than reasonable economic equivalence. 18 9
This can be difficult to establish under a pure fraudulent transfer
analysis, as evidenced by cases willing to indulge the fiction of equivalence even in the situation where the value goes to a third party, such
as redeemed shareholders or a seller-corporation in the leveraged
buyout scenario. 9
It is at this juncture that we believe the nuisance analysis has a
great deal to offer in providing a counterweight to the opportunities
for mischief created by Revised Article 9's vast expansion of and deference to secured credit. This is not to suggest by any stretch of the
imagination that every extension of secured debt is nefarious, or even
that the value judgments made by the drafters relative to the correlation between the good of the economy and the relaxing of most restraints on secured financing were wrong. It is only to recognize that,
at the same time, the confluence of limited liability and the expansion
of secured debt has created the potential for abuse which, under the
current doctrinal scheme, has no natural predator-a bad thing no
less in the world of finance than in nature.
Affordable credit, the shibboleth constantly trotted out in defense of full priority, if a good thing to a point, is also not a "holy
grail" to be pursued oblivious to collateral damage. The possibility
that, if abused, the privileges normally associated with the taking of
security may be withdrawn through application of the nuisance model
creates a powerful incentive for secured lenders to make more rational credit decisions then they have reason to make under the cur11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(11) (2000); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT
4(a)(2)(i), 7A U.L.A. 301 (1999). Unlike "insolvency," "unreasonably small capital"
is not defined by the UNW. FRAUDLENT CONVEYANCES Aar §§ 2, 5, 7A U.L.A. 22-23,
188

§

105 (1999). This has engendered confusion over the relationship between these concepts: some courts have equated a finding of equitable insolvency (inability to pay
debts as they come due) with that of unreasonably small capital. See, e.g., MFS/Sun
Life Trust-High Yield Series v. Van Dusen Airport Servs. Co., 910 F. Supp. 913, 943
(S.D.N.Y. 1995). The better view, however, is that unreasonably small capital denotes
a financial condition short of equitable insolvency. See Bruce A. Markell, Toward True
and PlainDealing: A Theory of Fraudulent Transfers Involving Unreasonably Small Capital,
21 IND. L. REv. 469, 498 (1988).
189 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i).
190 See, e.g., In re R.M.L., Inc., 92 F.3d 139, 151 (3d Cir. 1996); Mellon Bank, N.A
v. Metro Commc'ns, Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 646-48 (3d Cir. 1991).
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the cost of credit in certain
rent regime. And if that does increase
that this cost is a fairer reflection
cases, then, again, we would submit
of the internal risk of the transaction.
account of security
In short, the ascendancy of the property-based
secured claims will always trump
does not mean, or have to mean, that
we have tried in summary fashion
their unsecured counterparts. What
the categorization of security as
to illustrate is that by approaching
conventional terms, while still reproperty in metaphoric rather than
analogy (i.e., property), Article 9
maining true to the core conceptual
the other legal systems and princican be reconciled dynamically with
in isolation. These include, among
ples from which it cannot operate
principles designed to reconcile
others, property-based systems and
this context, to promote distribucross-boundary conflicts and, in
tional fairness.
V.

REMEDY

to be a nuisance-an abuse
If the security interest is determined
is the appropriate remedial reof purposive intent and form-what
already exists in the academic literasponse? The answer, we believe,
some extent of the secured party's
ture, and that is subordination to9 1
Certainly we do not contend that
legal entitlement to full priority.
are or become insufficient to satevery case where the debtor's assets
for
the debtor is an appropriate case
isfy the totality of claims against
debtor's assets are or become so
loss of full priority. But when the
save that of the secured lender,
inadequate as not to cover any claims
of legal priorities becomes
the predicate for examining a re-ordering
far more compelling.
full versus partial priority
The largely academic debate over
leading up to the revision of
largely occurred in the years and months
of the final approved, and
Article 9;192 and, in light of the provisions
letof the statute might seem a dead
now universally-adopted, version
in
note 8, at 905-06 (proposing subordination
191 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra
weekly
other
case of nonconsensual creditors and
bankruptcy of full priority in the
& Jesse M. Fried,
Bebchuk
Arye
Lucian
also
see
adjusting or nonadjusting creditors);
and a
Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts
is
The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured
priority
full
that
(arguing
1279, 1286-88 (1997)
note
Reply to Critics, 82 CORNELL L. REv.
supra
of explicit consent to subordination);
inconsistent with the requirement
engage in riskier
secured claims encourages firms to
106 (arguing that full priority to
risks). Other
these
of
do not internalize the cost
have
behavior than optimal because they
securitization
through
accomplished
remedial responses to judgment-proofing
cited supra note 103.
also been proposed. See authorities
to Valuing Se& Jesse M. Fried, A New Apporach
192 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk
note 27.
supra
Warren,
L. REV. 2386 (2001);
cured Claims in Bankrputcy, 114 RARV.
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ter. t 93 This is of course another artifact of the triumph of the "security interest as property" model, but it only needs be so if one takes a
formalistic view of the statute rather than one that harmonizes its positive law provisions with its purposive objectives and applicable nonCode doctrine.
It is our contention, for the reasons previously stated, that the
deliberate, or even improvident, judgment-proofing of the debtor by
means of incurring secured debt in excess of the liquidation value of
the firm's assets sets forth an example of when it may be appropriate
to conceptualize the secured creditor's property interest as a nuisance. In turn, this should allow-wholly within the framework of the
property metaphor that has come to dominate how security is understood-for some limitation on the secured creditor's rights in relation
to the parties victimized by the nuisance; i.e., unsecured creditors at
whose expense the scheme was hatched. But what is the legal basis for
reordering priority? Surely, it is not found in the four corners of Article 9 itself, which has unconditionally embraced full priority. Moreover, because of the bankruptcy law's recognition and enforcement of
the state law rights and interests that creditors bring with them into a
federal bankruptcy proceeding, full priority of secured credit has become a basic principle of bankruptcy as well. Although one could
question fairly whether the imaginative associations entailed in the
understanding of a security interest that pervade under state law necessarily have to and should endure in the context of a collectivized
proceeding,1 94 a more practical answer already exists. That answer begins with the Bankruptcy Code itself, which codifies the bankruptcy
courts' inherent statutory authority to invoke their equitable powers
to subordinate for distribution purposes all or any part of an allowed
claim.t 9 5
As it has been interpreted by the courts, harking back to its origins in the Supreme Court's opinion in Pepper v. Litton, 9 6 the doc193 See Warren, supra note 16, at 325; see also supra notes 71-73 and accompanying
text (proposing a revision of Article 9 that would effectuate the set-aside proposal).
194 See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 8, at 2289-96 (urging adoption of a
value-based conceptualization of secured claims in bankruptcy as an alternative to the
property-based account that pervades under state law based on a normative view of
bankruptcy policy that recognizes the interests of noncreditor constituencies).
195 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2000). The purpose of the doctrine is to allow bankruptcy
courts "to reprioritize the order of allowed claims based on the equities of the case,
rather than to allow or disallow the claim in the first instance." Rafael lgnacio Pardo,
Note, Beyond the Limits of Equity Jurisprudence:No-Fault Equitable Subordination,75 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1489, 1490 (2000) (quoting In re County of Orange, 219 B.R. 543, 559 (Bankr.

C.D. Cal. 1997)).
196

308 U.S. 295 (1939).
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trine of equitable subordination has generally, but not always, been
predicated on some form of "creditor misconduct."' 97 In this sense,
equitable subordination has been understood to differ from fraudulent transfer analysis, the latter having at its core a focus on the
debtor's conduct (or misconduct, as the case may be). However, on
two occasions in 1996, the Supreme Court of the United States, while
rejecting any categorical subordination of claims in favor of a case-bycase approach, declined to overrule several circuit court decisions applying a no-fault standard on a case-by-case basis. 198 In effect, the
Court left intact at least three circuit court decisions ordering equitable subordination in the absence of creditor misconduct in order to
protect innocent creditors from misconduct by the debtor.1 99 Thus,
arguably, statutory authority for remediating a nuisance by adjusting
the priority of claims in bankruptcy is already extant. The willingness
of courts to do so, however, and the appropriateness of such action in
the face of the general bias in bankruptcy to enforce state law entitlements and enforce statutory priorities, would be open to serious question in the absence of an analogous form of relief under applicable
non bankruptcy law, which has been thought not to exist. That assumption, however, has now been cast into considerable doubt.
In an intriguing article, Professor David Gray Carlson has suggested a basis for eschewing the metaphors that have dominated
fraudulent transfer law and equitable subordination, and in their
place substituting a way of thinking about these areas of law that not
only more accurately captures their underlying policy aims and practical implications, but that also recognizes an inherent kinship between
the two doctrines. 20 0 Specifically, Carlson observes that the metaphoric concepts that have traditionally come to structure these doctrines in commercial discourse-"avoidance" in the case of fraudulent
transfers and "demotion" with respect to equitable subordinationare the wrong concepts because, while they may produce serendip-

197 The case most frequently cited for this proposition is Benjamin v. Diamond (In
re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692, 699-700 (5th Cir. 1977).
198 United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 228-29
(1996); United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 543 (1996).
199 Burden v. United States (In re Burden), 917 F.2d 115, 119-20 (3d Cir. 1990);
Schultz Broadway Inn v. United States, 912 F.2d 230, 233-34 (8th Cir. 1990); In re
Virtual Network Servs. Corp., 902 F.2d 1246, 1249-50 (7th Cir. 1990).
200 David G.Carlson, The Logical Structure of Fraudulent Transfers and EquitableSubordination,45 WM. & MARY L. Rnv. 157 (2003).
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itously the "right" result in many cases, they fail to produce the de20
sired result in marginal but no less important cases. '
Professor Carlson's analysis shows that, in each instance, the remedy is actually the same; namely, expropriation and transfer of specific
property rights.20 2 By replacing the concepts of "avoidance" and "subordination" with the single notion of transfer, Carlson convincingly
demonstrates that commercial discourse is brought into "closer identity with its actual logical structure." 2 3 Under this approach, two
seemingly inconsistent remedies, invoked in response to different misdeeds, are harmonized by the recognition that in either case what actually occurs is an assignment of one creditor's claim to those harmed
by the inequitable conduct.
The intuition that what actually transpires, whether the misconduct is challenged under the fraudulent transfer law or the doctrine
of equitable subordination, is transfer of specific property rights, exposes an even more important insight for present purposes. That is,
although ordinarily understood as a uniquely federal remedy, Carlson's research and analysis reveals that "equitable subordination is
simply the fraudulent transfer remedy in disguise and that both remedies can be considered to be within the competence of state law to
achieve." 20 4 In other words, equitable subordination, if essentially the
fraudulent transfer law as applied in the context of a collective proceeding, must (despite frequent disavowal120) exist as part of the general common law of the states, and Carlson makes a compelling case
20 6
that it does.
201 Id. at 164-65 (noting that in the "average" case, the proper characterization of
the remedy makes no practical difference, but that the concept of "avoidance" incorrectly implies a return of value to the debtor in the rare fraudulent transfer case
where a surplus exists, and "demotion" fails to adequately explain what transpires
when subordination is to some but not all creditors).
202 Id. at 165 ("What is really going on in all cases is a transfer of specific property
rights.").
203 Id. at 162.
204 Id. at 164.
205 See id. at 163 n.17 (citing 9281 Shore Rd. Owners Corp. v. Seminole Realty Co.
(In re 9281 Shore Rd. Owners Corp.), 187 B.R. 837, 852-54 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995);
Greenfield v. Shuck, 867 F. Supp. 62, 70 (D. Mass. 1994); In re SPM Mfg. Corp., 163
B.R. 411, 413 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994); In re Poughkeepsie Hotel Assocs. joint Venture,
132 B.R. 287, 292 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991); Primex Plastics Corp. v. Lawrence Prods.,
Inc. No. 89 Civ. 2994 JSM), 1991 WL 183367, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 1991)).
206 Carlson, supra note 200, at 218-19 (pointing to examples from New York and
other states). Under Carlson's analysis, equitable subordination essentially works as
an assignment of the claim of one creditor to the creditors harmed by the first creditor's conduct. Id. at 200. So understood, it is functionally and analytically distinct
from what occurs when a transfer is set aside or avoided as fraudulent.
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The implications of this insight for remedying a nuisance-creating security interest are obvious. It affirms that courts, both in a bankruptcy context and out, faced with a security transfer that abuses the
form, have the power and authority to transfer back the value improperly misappropriated from unsecured creditors by adjusting relative
priorities. Moreover, this can be legitimately accomplished without
disturbing the prevailing conceptualization of the security interest as
property since, by definition, the transfer that is contemplated by the
remedy is fundamentally a transfer recognized on long-standing property concepts and doctrine. Historically, of course, the related principles of security of property and nemo dat-the debtor's ability to
convey that which it owns and the rule of derivative title 2 0 7 -have always been limited by the law of fraudulent transfer which effectively
proscribes certain property transfers perceived to prejudice unduly innocent creditors.20 8 The effect of finding a particular transfer to fall
within the categorical parameters of a fraudulent transfer is to require
that the transferee return back that which was conveyed for the benefit of the debtor's other creditors. All we are suggesting is that such a
"transfer" can also be accomplished, when the misconduct consists of
judgment-proofing through use of secured debt by ordering the
whole or partial subordination of priority-thereby, resulting in, effectively, an abatement of the nuisance.
The reordering of priorities in this manner in circumstances
when all available assets have been conveyed to secure financing is not
simply a mechanism to redress managerial excess or creditor misconduct in specific instances where it occurs. The recognition of such a
nuisance-like remedy should also, we believe, have a salutary in terrorer effect in terms of promoting more control and discipline over
excessive risk taking. In other words, if the combination of full priority and the corresponding bankruptcy rules which implement that
principle fails to deter and even encourages judgment-proofing
schema by facilitating the externalization of firm failure, then the adjustment of those legal rules to ensure that all creditors share in the
risk of nonpayment should promote overall social utility.20

9

207 See Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 544, 550 (1872) ("No one in general
can sell personal property and convey valid title to it unless he is the owner.... Nemo
dat quod non habet.").
208 See, e.g., Sturtevant & Keep v. Ballard, 9 Johns. 337, 343 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1812)
("The law, in every period of its history has spoken a uniform language, and has always looked with great jealousy upon a sale or appropriation of goods, without parting
with the possession, because it forms so easy and so fruitful a source of deception.").
209 See Warren, supra note 27, at 1388 ("The ultimate question is not whether a
partial priority scheme might cause some constriction in lending .... The real ques-
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Stated another way, abatement of the "nuisance" created by the
only parties at the bargaining table-the debtor and the particular
creditor advantaged by the scheme-by requiring the transfer back
for unsecured creditors of some portion of that value upon firm failure would certainly result in a more equitable sharing of the loss in
that case. Beyond that, however, it would also assist in ensuring that
that future credit decisions appropriately factor into the analysis a realistic and prudent assessment of the debtor's financial prospects and
the likelihood of insolvency. Furthermore, it would create rational
incentives, even after the initial extension of value, for secured creditors to monitor and thwart managerial decisions that eschew conventional risk calculations in pursuit of short-term but low probability
riches.2 10 In sum, if more credit is available, or available at a lower
cost, simply because the providers of that credit have no motivation or
reason to factor the true cost of credit into the lending decision, then
it is far from clear to us that this is something the commercial law
should embrace. Thus, the conventional arguments against diluting
Article 9's full priority regime collapse under the weight of their own
internal illogic, and the road is cleared to fashion a remedy suited to
redress the "security interest as a nuisance" phenomenon as and when
it occurs.
CONCLUSION

The introduction of equity or equity-like notions into the Article
9 priority scheme has been questioned as potentially undermining
commercial certainty and efficiency.2 11 But, in the absence of malleable equitable controls, what are the constraints on secured credit?
Thanks to the conceptual monopoly owned by Article 9, most especially in its revised version, the security interest is property for all ends,
assuring the secured creditor property priority on a field of play where
other claimants hold no interest dignified by that label. What is more,
unlike other property interests, the security interest has come to occupy the elevated but questionable status of property endowed with
immunity from conventional property misuse or abuse controls, most
notably for our purposes, the nuisance doctrine.2 12 We challenge that
tion is how the efficiency arguments, even if they were unambiguously true, stack up
against other considerations [such as community sensibilities and fairness].").

210 See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text for discussion of the perverse
incentives created by the property-based account of security.
211
SeejAMEsj. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 24-19
(4th ed. 1995) (entitled, "Weird Cases: The Creeping Infestation of Article 9 Priority
Rules by 'Principles of Law and Equity' and other Cases on the Fringe of Title 9").

212

See supra Part Ill,
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immunity as irrational on the grounds of distributive inequity, as well
as the systemic adverse impact it creates in the form of perverse incentives simultaneously bearing on lender-imposed discipline and mana3
gerial accountability2
It is, we would contend, unreasonable, not to mention illogical, to
maintain that the property regime that attends Article 9 should partake of some but not all of the principles of the conveyancing model
that apply with respect to other forms of property transactions. Thus,
assuming a security interest is understood metaphorically to convey an
interest in property, ownership of that interest, like any other property interest, does not carry with it the absolute and unfettered right
to interfere with the legitimate interests of others. Borrowing from
the source concept that has, for better or worse, dominated the Article 9 revision process-namely, property law doctrine and analysis-it
is our position that when the debtor has through security allowed or
conspired (which is really of no moment) with creditors to permit
management to ignore the normal risk calculations associated with
investment decisions by shifting that risk to potential tort victims,
14
small trade creditors, and arguably even current equity,2 some limitation on the normal rules of prioritization are appropriate to abate
the nuisance. The remedial underpinnings that form the basis for
such limitations are analogically already extant in the prevailing doctrines of fraudulent transfer law and equitable subordination, properly understood. When implicated, those concepts, which Article 9
cannot rationally exist independent of or immune from, are remedied
through transfer back of the misappropriated assets, in this context
transfer back of all or some of the priority interest through
subordination.
But if secured creditors are compelled by the possibility of a subsequent reordering of priority to factor now a risk premium into the
cost of lending, will not the inevitable effect be to raise the cost of
credit or limit the availability of credit to suboptimal levels? This, of
213 The point is not theoretical-the impact of these incentives is real, measurable, and, it would appear, growing. See LoPucki, supra note 11, at 17-18 (describing
the effects of cheap and easy secured credit on distribution to unsecured creditors in
bankruptcy). The risk is particularly acute in the case of firms operating on the precipice of insolvency where secured lenders, knowing they are protected up to the value
of their collateral, are less inclined to monitor and control unduly risky investment
decisions, and managers, with nothing to lose, are encouraged to engage in just such
activities. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
214 Most literature focuses on tort victims. See supra note 107. We do not. While
tort claimants are the most sympathetic casualties of judgment proofing, they are, by
far, not the only ones who suffer at the hands of a bankruptcy system that, for the
most part, enforces state law priority rules.
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